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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 1972, the Congress of the United States of America
proposed to the states for ratification the twenty-seventh amendment to
the United States Constitution:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
During the period of discussion of this proposed amendment in Con-
gress, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal suggested: "Well, we're all
for the ladies, but even so, before we write some new words into the Consti-
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; J.C.D., Gregorian
University, Rome, Italy; M.A., Columbia University; J.D., St. John's University.
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tution it'd be nice to know what they really do mean."'
Faced with a similar quandary, the Canon Law Society of America,
at its October 1977 National Convention, approved a resolution authoriz-
ing the Board of Governors to "appoint a special Task Force to investigate
whether or not the Equal Rights Amendment is an effective instrument for
the achievement and protection of the rights of women and thus deserving
of the endorsement of the Canon Law Society of America . .. ."
More specifically, the Task Force was asked by the Board of Governors
to study the following areas:
1. Is the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) an effective instrument for the
achievement and protection of the rights of women?
2. Is it deserving of the endorsement of the Canon Law Society of America?
3. What would the impact of the passage of the ERA be on the Roman
Catholic Church, particularly given the sex qualifications required for certain
positions (i.e., to be clergy, to hold certain offices, etc.)?
While entrusting this charge to the Task Force, the Board of Gover-
nors emphasized that "the Task Force is not requested to come in with a
recommendation for or against the ERA, but to do a technical analysis of
the ERA in the light of the above questions." There are many additional
issues that the Task Force could have considered in its study. Because the
subject areas frequently associated with the ERA are so numerous, how-
ever, the Task Force is necessarily selective. The presentation, its length
notwithstanding, is still intended to be an illustrative summary, not an
exhaustive survey, of a topic with far-reaching consequences for persons of
both sexes.
U1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Congressional Approval Background
On August 20, 1920, the nineteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution was ratified and American women finally achieved the right
to vote. Spurred on by this victory, several women's groups, especially the
National Woman's Party, initiated a campaign for complete legal equality
between men and women and, in 1923, succeeded in having a bill intro-
duced in Congress which was substantially similar to today's proposed
ERA. The National Woman's Party contended that suffrage did not make
women full citizens. It argued that full citizenship would not be achieved
until inequality was eliminated in all areas, including jury service, prop-
erty rights, marriage and divorce.
While there was widespread cooperation among women's organiza-
tions in the suffrage movement, the ERA fomented profound disagree-
ment. It received the endorsement of some women's groups. Other politi-
cally active organizations attacked it as vicious, doctrinaire, hysterical
Wall St. Journal, Aug. 13, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
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feminism, and a direct threat to protective legislation for women. 2
By the mid-1920's and through the 1930's, opposing camps were at war
with each other over the ERA. The proponents of the amendment adhered
to the position that women were exactly the same as men in all their
principal attributes while their opponents argued that women were a
weaker sex whose rights needed to be safeguarded by special legislation.
The controversy between the two feminine camps was probably one of the
major factors which diverted congressional attention away from the
amendment itself and also prevented formulation of a comprehensive legal
theory of its meaning.'
Since 1923, the ERA has been introduced into every Congress. In the
House of Representatives, it never got past the Judiciary Committee until
1970 when it reached the floor. In the Senate, the Judiciary Committee
carried out extensive hearings during the 1940's and 1950's and on several
occasions, debated the proposal before the full Senate. In fact, in 1950 and
1953, the resolution on the amendment received the necessary two-thirds
vote but with the so-called "Hayden rider" attached, which provided that
the amendment "shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits or
exemptions conferred by law upon persons of the female sex."
Between 1953 and 1970, the amendment, introduced biennially, lan-
guished in Congress but the women's movement suddenly took on new life
in the political arena. This was also the period of judicial concern for civil
rights in the Warren Court and many felt that a more expansive interpreta-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by the
Supreme Court would bring equality in the rights of women.
By 1970, many proponents of equality for women concluded that the
Supreme Court decisions were not going to achieve equal rights for women
in the immediate future. Instead, they revived the campaign for the ERA.
Hearings were held by Congress, scholarly articles were published, and
lobbying was carried out by active women's groups. On August 10, 1970,
the House of Representatives for the first time since 1923 voted on the ERA
and passed it by a majority of 350 to 15. The Senate did not act upon it,
however, and it died in that 91st Congress. It was reintroduced in the 92nd
Congress and finally received the necessary approval by both the House
and Senate. The House adopted the resolution for passage of the Amend-
ment on October 12, 1971 by a vote of 354-24. The Senate approved the
resolution on March 22, 1972 by a vote of 84-8.
Process of Ratification
After both Houses of Congress have approved a proposed amendment
by a two-thirds vote, the amendment is forwarded to the Administrator of
the United States General Services Administration. The Administrator
See B. BABCOCK, A FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DIScRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 129 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CAUSES].
I Id. at 130.
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publishes the text in the United States Statutes at Large and sends a
certified copy to the governor of each state who transmits it to the state
legislature. If favorably voted upon by both houses of the state legislature,
a certificate to that effect is forwarded to the General Services Administra-
tor and filed in the United States Archives. When the Administrator has
received certificates of approval from three-fourths of the states, he pre-
pares a certificate of ratification which is published in the Federal Register
and in the Statutes at Large. This action constitutes the official proclama-
tion of the ratification. No action is required by the President of the United
States nor by the governor of a state in the ratification process. Similarly,
neither the President nor a governor has a right of veto in this process.
When Congress voted favorably on the ERA, it required that the ratifi-
cation by three-fourths of the states be completed in 7 years; that is, by
March 22, 1979, and that the amendment would take effect 2 years after
ratification. On October 6, 1978, Congress voted for an extension of the
ratification deadline to June 30, 1982.
Present Status
Twenty-two states ratified the amendment in the same year as its
passage in Congress. Eight ratified it in 1973, three in 1974, one in 1975
and the last one in 1977. At this date, therefore, thirty-five states have
ratified the amendment. Approval is required from three more states of the
fifteen which have not ratified for the ERA to become law.
It should be noted that three states that originally ratified the amend-
ment have since rescinded their approval. All three - Tennessee, Idaho,
Nebraska - had given approval in 1972.
The legal effect of rescission by these states is controverted and will
become a heated issue if the amendment is ratified by a 1- or 2- state
margin.
III. MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
General Principles
The leading legal scholars supporting the ERA as well as the legal
scholars opposing it are in substantial agreement on the basic theory of the
amendment, which can be briefly summarized as follows: sex cannot be a
factor in determining the legal rights of men or of women. In essence, the
amendment mandates absolute legal equality of treatment of both sexes.5
I Kentucky, which ratified the Amendment in1972, also rescinded its approval but the rescis-
sion was vetoed by the Acting Governor.
I S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 689];
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN, IMPACT ERA 176-77 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as IMPAcT ERA]. For a thorough analysis and discussion of the import of the ERA, see
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
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One exception to this absolute equality occurs in the rare instance
when differentiation is required due to "unique physical characteristics"
attributable to members of a particular sex.' According to this exception,
physical factors, not emotional, psychological or social factors, found ex-
clusively in one sex may be the basis for legal differentiation. Usual exam-
ples are laws dealing with wet nurses, sperm donors, childbearing as dis-
tinct from childrearing, and determination of paternity.7 A second excep-
tion to the absolute prohibition of the ERA, to the extent that it is recog-
nized, is where the constitutional right of privacy construed by the Su-
preme Court permits the maintenance of separate personal facilities such
as public restrooms.' This latter exception is the subject of considerable
debate, and is discussed in detail later.'
Despite these qualifications, one commentator has stated:
[Tihe term "absolute" is still accurate to distinguish the standard of review
from those applied under the fourteenth amendment. . . . The principles
of "separate but equal," "reasonable classification," "suspect classification,"
"fundamental right," "strict scrutiny," and "compelling governmental inter-
est" would not be applicable under the Equal Rights Amendment.
Further indication that Congress intended the absolute standard is dem-
onstrated by the repeated refusal of both the House and Senate to amend the
Equal Rights Amendment with any limiting or crippling amendments."0
A clear grasp of the basic theory of the ERA is indispensable to a
proper understanding of the implications of this amendment and of the
controversy which has accompanied it throughout its history. It is the
absolute, inflexible rigidity of equality between the sexes demanded by the
amendment that has played a large part in fomenting the anxieties and
fears about its possible consequences.
An elaboration of this brief summary of the theory underlying the
Amendment will help clarify its meaning. The following general principles
Basis]. This article is considered by both proponents and opponents as a masterpiece of
scholarship and the best indication as to what will be the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the ERA. The clear thesis of this article is that the equality demanded by the proposed
Amendment is absolute. "Only an unequivocal ban against taking sex into account supplies
a rule adequate to achieve the objectives of the Amendment. From this analysis it follows
that the constitutional mandate must be absolute." Constitutional Basis, supra, at 892.
1 S. RP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 2; A. BINGAMAN, CALIFORNIA COMMSSION ON STATUS OF
WoMEN's RIGHTS AMENDMENT, A COMMENTARY ON THE EFncT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT ON STATE LAws AND INSTITUTIONS 18 (1975).
'See BINGAjAN, supra note 6, at 35-36; B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz & A. PucE,
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN'S RIGHTS]; Ferrell, The
Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution-Areas of Controversy, 6 URAN
LAw. 853, 867 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right of privacy exception is
discussed in Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 900-02. See also L. TRmE, AMERICAN
CONSTrImONAL LAw §§ 16-28 (1978).
I See notes 115-140 and accompanying text infra.
10 Ferrell, supra note 7,at 865-66 (footnotes omitted).
24 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1979
are an expansion of the absolute equality theory of the ERA as discussed
above:
1. Psychological and social differences between men and women are
not acceptable as bases for differentiation since the evidence is not certain
that such qualities are unique to one sex or the other. "Unless the differ-
ence is one that is characteristic of all women and no men, or of all men
and no women, it is not the sex factor, but the individual factor which
should be determinative."" If, for example, one sex could be characterized
by a special trait, for example, physical strength, intelligence, longer life,
the presence of that trait to a greater degree in one sex will not justify
classification by sex rather than by the particular trait. 2 When a legal
classification of persons is necessary, the law must make it on the basis of
traits which are sex-neutral and common to both sexes.' 3
2. Except for the unique characteristics and right of privacy qualifi-
cations discussed above, all federal, state and local laws and regulations
must treat every person, male or female, as an individual." The law must
always deal with the individual attributes of the particular person and not
make any broad applications based upon the irrelevant factor of sex.'
3. The aim of the Amendment is equal status of men and women.
This is accomplished only by merging the rights of men and women into a
"single system of equality."'" To achieve equality of both sexes and self-
fulfillment of the individual, the egalitarian principle of the Amendment
must be applied "comprehensively and without exception."" Just as in
racial equality, a unified and universal recognition of equal rights between
men and women is imperative." The constitutional mandate must be abso-
lute. The ERA will tolerate neither a separate-but-equal status nor any
differentiation even if it is reasonable, or is beneficial rather than
"invidious," or is justified by "compelling reasons." To repeat, equality of
rights under the Amendment means that sex is never a factor. 9
As noted above, opponents of the ERA agree with its proponents on
the absolute interpretation of the Amendment. It is this absoluteness that
causes their opposition, which is apparent from Professor Philip Kurland's
observation that the Amendment "would command the treatment of men
and women as if there were no differences between them, even at the price
of removing protections and benefits that have otherwise been afforded to
" See Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REV.
225, 226 (1971) (emphasis in original).
" See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 889.
"See Bellamy, Goodman, Kelly, Ross & Stanley, The Proposed Equal Rights Amendment:
A Brief in Support of its Ratification, Prepared for the League of Women's Voters of the U.S.
2 (1977).
" See Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1972).
" See Emerson, supra note 11, at 225.
Is See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 890.
17 Id.
," Id. at 892.
" Id. at 892, 902; BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 38-39; WoMEN's RGHTs, supra note 7, at 14.
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females. It was a demand for legal 'unisex' by constitutional mandate.9
20
Another commentator, Senator Sam Ervin, has noted that:
[ilf the Equal Rights for Women Amendment is approved, I believe that the
Supreme Court will reach the conclusion that the ERA annuls every existing
federal and state law making any distinction between men and women how-
ever reasonable such distinction might be in particular cases, and forever
robs the Congress and the legislatures of the fifty states of the constitutional
power to enact any such laws at any time in the future.21
To the same effect is the position taken by Dean Roscoe Pound, Professor
Paul Freund and others which states:
Presumably, the amendment would set up a constitutional yardstick of abso-
lute equality between men and women in all legal relationships. . . . The
proposal evidently contemplates no flexibility in construction but rather a
rule of rigid equality. . . . The basic fallacy in the proposed amendment is
that it attempts to deal with complicated and highly concrete problems
arising out of a diversity of human relationships in terms of a single and
simple abstraction. . . . That the proposed equal rights Amendment would
open up an era of regrettable consequences for the legal status of women in
this country is highly probable. That it would open up a period of extreme
confusion in constitutional law is a certainty.Y
Public vs. Private Sphere
The ERA requires that equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged "by the United States or by any State." All agree that
this limits the direct application of the Amendment to governmental or
state action and that it does not apply to private or individual action.2 In
view of several decisions under the fourteenth amendment, particularly in
the area of racial discrimination, it can be safely predicted that the ERA
will apply also to private entities when they are so intertwined with the
state that there is either "significant state involvement" or they are per-
forming a "governmental or public function."'2 It is not very likely, how-
ever, that the "public function" criterion will be applied to private institu-
tions. Presuming that the ERA will be applied in a manner analogous to
the fourteenth amendment's ban on racial discrimination, courts will prob-
0 Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARv. C.R.
- C.L. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1971).
2, S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 33.
n 118 CONG. REC. 11-12 (1972). These views are shared by several additional legal authorities.
E.g., P. ScHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE PosrrlvE WoMAN 68 (1977); J. WrrRsPOON, CoMMETS
ON THE EQUAL RIGHTs AMENDMENT, MEMORANDUM TO NATiONAL RIGHT TO LiFE CoMmrrEE 1
(1975).
n See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 12; CAUSES, supra note 2, at 90-94; IMPAcr ERA, supra
note 5, at 60.
" S. Ross, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 22-23 (1973); Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 905;
Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv.
216, 220 (1971).
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ably follow the lead of the fourteenth amendment cases which have held
constitutional restrictions inapplicable to churches, private schools, pri-
vate single-sex clubs, or other nonpublic establishments, under the public
function rationale.
The standard that will be followed in most cases will be the
"significant state involvement" test. Factors which determine a finding of
"significant state involvement" include state regulation of the private in-
stitution, tax exemption, public funding and state licensing. If there is
enough state involvement, the private institution will be within the ambit
of the ERA.n For example, if a private institution receives a large amount
of government funding, the possibility of its subjection to the ERA in-
creases. This would be especially relevant where the issue of applicability
involves private colleges, universities and hospitals."
A question arises concerning Church-related elementary and high
schools as well as other private institutions which are tax-exempt. Will this
tax-exempt status by itself subject them to the ERA? The Supreme Court,
in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York," indicated that tax-
exempt status, without additional connections with the state, would not
bring private schools into the sphere of government action. "Thus it ap-
pears that, in the absence of special factors, under present court decisions
on state action private educational institutions would remain within the
private sector, not subject to the constitutional requirements of the Equal
Rights Amendment."
Two recent developments indicate a contrary position and tend to link
tax-exemption by itself to "significant state involvement." The first is the
1978 Group Ruling on Federal Taxes and Tax Returns issued on July 11,
1978 and sent to all dioceses by the United States Catholic Conference.
The letter advises that special attention be paid to Revenue Procedure 75-
50. Revenue Procedure 75-50 sets forth guidelines and recordkeeping re-
quirements relating to racially nondiscriminatory policies which must be
complied with by private schools, including church-related schools, in
order to establish and maintain tax-exempt status. Under this procedure,
private schools are required to file an annual certification of racial nondis-
crimination with the IRS. Private school compliance with Revenue Proce-
dure 75-50, the letter continues, is the target of a recent program imple-
mented by the IRS calling for increased monitoring of the racial nondiscri-
mination policies and practices of private schools. Failure to comply with
the directive, it is warned, could jeopardize the exempt status of the school
u See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 21-23.
s See Rice, Testimony on ERA Before Joint Hearing of Indiana Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and House Human Affairs Committee 5 (1977); Ferrell, supra note 7, at 864.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
n See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 907; cf. Babcock, Impact of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 3 HuMAN RIGTs 132, 135 (1973) (the ERA "would be greatly felt in the schools,
private and parochial as well as public").
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and, in the case of a school operated by a church, the exempt status of the
church itself.
A departure from the Walz holding is also reflected in a tax exemption
case involving racial discrimination based on religious beliefs. In
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States," a North Carolina
district court held that a private school, which systematically denied ad-
mission to blacks based on its interpretation of the Bible, is not a §
501(c)(3) exempt organization and must pay federal withholding, FICA
and unemployment taxes. Such enforcement of federal public policy
against racial discrimination, the court reasoned, does not violate the First
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses20
It should also be observed that the national experience indicates that
our legislation abhors two different legal policies in significant areas, such
as discrimination. While there may be a formal distinction between gov-
ernment action'and private action, in application, such as in racial dis-
crimination, Congress has utilized the Commerce Clause and states have
resorted to their police powers to bring the private sphere in line with the
public standard. As this was the experience in the areas of discrimination
based on race, religion, color or national origin, it can be anticipated to
occur with the ERA.3 1
Invalidation - Extension - Amendment of Unconstitutional Statutes
When a statute is determined to be unconstitutional under the ERA,
several alternatives are available to legislatures to effectuate compliance
therewith. The statute could be completely invalidated, or extended to the
other sex so that it applies to both sexes, or amended so that the new law
treats both sexes equally. For example, each of these options may be
adopted where the inquiry concerns a statute allowing a half-hour rest
period for women workers but not men. Clearly unconstitutional under the
ERA, this statute could be: invalidated so that no one receives a rest
period; extended so that both sexes receive a half-hour rest period; or,
amended so that both sexes are allowed a fifteen minute rest period.
Several rules of interpretation will guide the application of these alter-
natives. In the face of an unconstitutional statute under the ERA, the court
must determine what alternative the legislature would have followed had
it foreseen that all or part of the statute was invalid. In making this deter-
mination, the legislative history and intent must be scrutinized by the
court. Additionally, laws which impose a burden on one sex will be invali-
dated, while laws which confer benefits or privileges will generally be ex-
tended to the other sex. Where the extension of benefits or privileges would
be industrially or economically disruptive, however, the statute would be
" 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
"o Id. at 1316.
"' See Hillman, Sex and Employment Under the Equal Rights Amendment, 67 Nw. U.L. REv.
789, 791 (1973); Bellamy, supra note 13, at 3.
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invalidated. Finally, courts have followed the traditional rule that penal
laws are to be interpreted strictly so that a criminal statute which discrimi-
nates will generally not be extended to the other sex but eliminated en-
tirely.3"
IV. MILITARY SERVICE AND THE ERA
The Constitution of the United States, in Article I, Section 8, empow-
ers Congress "to raise and support Armies, . . .to provide and maintain
a Navy." Since the Constitution made no distinction between men and
women in this particular section, Congress has always had the power to
draft women. While federal legislation on the draft never included
women, 33 World War I did see the establishment of separate branches of
the military services for women and women's entitlement to veterans'
rights. 34
Since the military services have always been male-dominated it is
correct to conclude that differences in treatment of men and women have
existed and, to a great degree, still exist. Until 1974, women were subject
to more exacting enlistment standards than men. Requirements for accept-
ance to Army Officer Candidate School are more severe for women than
for men. Direct appointments to a number of positions in the Navy and
Marines are restricted to males. Women cannot be assigned to naval ves-
sels other than hospital ships and transports. 3 In all branches of the armed
services, women are excluded from certain occupational fields, particularly
those relating to combat. Several grounds for discharge apply only to
women-a woman who becomes pregnant must be discharged as well as a
woman with dependent children. Because most high-ranking positions are
accessible only by men, women naval officers are given a longer tenure of
commissioned service than men before mandatory discharge for want of
promotion. 36
A consequence of the male dominance of the military is the very lim-
ited number of women who enter the armed services. In turn, the many
and substantial medical, educational, vocational training, employment,
housing and insurance benefits that accrue to those who serve in the armed
forces are available to only a miniscule number of women. This reality is
seen as a form of discrimination against women.3"
The effect of the ERA relative to military service is significant. The
amendment will allow no exceptions in the military between males and
females. "Neither the right to privacy nor any unique physical characteris-
3 See generally Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 913-20.
" See, e.g., The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-471a (1976).
, Lexen, The Equal Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247, 254 (1972) (Israel, Vietnam).
11 See CAUSES, supra note 2, at 170, 173; Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights
Amendment- Where Are We Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 259, 320 (1975).
" See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 974-
75; Conlin, supra note 35, at 268.
31 See Conlin, supra note 35, at 321.
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tic justifies different treatment of the sexes with respect to voluntary or
involuntary service, and pregnancy justifies only slightly different condi-
tions of service for women. '"" Any differential treatment between men and
women, such as in exemption from the draft, enlistment standards, as-
signment, training, in-service conditions, grounds for benefits, veterans'
benefits, would be stricken as violative of the Amendment's absolute pro-
hibition of sex discrimination."
The following specific consequences of the ERA illustrate the perva-
sive impact it would have on military institutions and policies: women
would be subject to a draft law; all occupational specialties, including
positions as engineers or fighter pilots, would be open equally to men and
women; all traces of separate promotional systems would be eradicated;
women would be assigned to any area of the military, including combat
duty and duty aboard navy vessels; women with dependent children could
not be discharged unless men with dependent children were likewise dis-
charged; and, except where privacy can be respected as a factor, all facili-
ties, such as officers' clubs, social facilities, athletic facilities and eating
facilities, must be open to both men and women.
While there is substantial agreement on the meaning of the ERA as it
relates to the military, the opponents foresee different results from those
envisioned by the proponents of the Amendment. Opponents view the
eligibility of women to the draft and to all military assignments equally
with men as "contrary to our customs and mores, and to the wishes of the
overwhelming majority of American citizens." ' 0 They predict the destruc-
tion of the family since, under the rigid equality required by the ERA,
mothers with dependent children would be placed in combat areas along-
side of men.4' Opponents of the Amendment claim that women in general
do not have the physical strength for meeting the challenges of combat
duty.
This condition of fitness is not attained through physical training alone, but
rather by developing, through training, a natural inborn physical strength
normally found in men but not in women. Army tests at Fort Jackson and
West Point show conclusively that most women do not have this strength.
For example, reports show that women suffer a very high injury rate, as a
rules are miserable in the field and cannot keep their minds on what they
are supposed to do, lack upper body strength, have trouble with long road
marches, and just don't like to beat people up when participating in hand-
to-hand combat training. 2
n See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 969.
n See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 13-14, 36-38.
" SCHLA, supra note 22, at 96.
11 See id.; Note, The "Equal Rights" Amendment-Positive Panacea or Negative Nostrum?,
59 Ky. L.J. 953, 983 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Positive Panacea].
42 Gatsis, Testimony Before North Carolina House Constitutional Amendment Committee
(1977).
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A similar reaction came from Brigadier General (Ret.) Elizabeth Hois-
ington: "I think we should continue to have a legal bar against women in
combat units - not because they are women but because the average
woman is simply not physically, mentally and emotionally qualified to
perform well in a combat situation for extended periods. '43
On the issue of women in combat areas, opponents cite the experience
of the Israelis who drafted women and assigned them to combat duty
during the 1948 war. As a result of their experience, especially of what
happened to the women prisoners-of-war, the Israelis no longer place them
in combat areas.
At the time when Congress was considering approval of the ERA, the
Defense Department sent a letter to Senator Birch Bayh, leading propo-
nent of the Amendment. This letter highlighted certain problems which
would arise in the military as a result of the passage of the Amendment,
concentrating on the two basic problems of women on combat duty and
separate facilities to protect the privacy of men and women. It was noted
that assigning men and women together in the field in direct combat roles
might adversely affect the efficiency and discipline of our forces. On the
other hand, if women were not assigned to duty in the field, overseas, or
on board ships, but were entering the armed forces in large numbers, a
disproportionate number of men serving more time in the field and on
board ship may result since a reduced number of positions would be avail-
able for their reassignment. Secondly, even if segregation of living quar-
ters and facilities are permitted under the Amendment, during combat
duty in the field there are often no facilities at all, and privacy for both
sexes might be impossible to provide or enforce. 9
Proponents of the ERA acknowledge and in fact fought for interpreta-
tion of the Amendment that would subject women to the draft and to
combat duty equally with men. They argue that there should not be a
traumatic fear of mothers being snatched away from their children. In the
event of a draft, mothers would be eligible for deferment equally with
fathers. Several possible alternatives to the present deferment provisions
exist. For example, neither parent in a family with children would be
drafted, or one parent, but not both would be drafted. Deferment could
be granted to that parent who actually takes care of the child or who re-
ceives a higher lottery number, or the parents could be allowed to
choose between themselves as to who will go and who will be deferred. 5
In other areas, women will be eligible for deferment for the same reasons
as men. Thus, women may claim deferment as public officials due to their
employment in essential operation, because of physical deficiencies, or as
female ministers. In addition, women, like men, may claim status as con-
scientious objectors.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 13, 1978, at 53.
" See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 37.
,5 See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 973; East, Impact of the ERA, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS
138, 144-46 (1973).
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The controversy over women in combat occasioned a series of counter-
arguments by proponents of the Amendment. It was noted that very few
women would ever be assigned to combat duty. When the draft was in
operation, only one per cent of the national pool of available males was
assigned to combat duties. Within the armed services, only fourteen per
cent of the men are assigned to combat units." Since present technological
warfare minimizes the need for physical strength, proponents have pro-
posed the image of a woman in combat in the next war sitting at a com-
puter table pressing a button. Moreover, women are physically capable to
perform many jobs classified as combat duty, such as piloting an airplane
or engaging in naval operations.'7 The proponents also urge that no evi-
dence has been found which would indicate that the presence of women in
combat units will create difficult problems. Women in other countries have
served effectively in this manner. There is no reason to assume, state the
proponents, that in a dangerous situation women will not be as serious and
well-disciplined as men.'"
V. EMPLOYMENT AND THE ERA
Melissa A. Thompson, Legislative Coordinator for the National Or-
ganization for Women, told a University of Maryland audience: "What
does the Equal Rights Amendment'really mean? Money! Money in the
pockets of women. The heart of all discrimination against women is money
''49
The chief source of money for women is employment outside the
house. Since the 1950's, there has been an accelerating influx of women
into the labor market. The explosion took place in the last several years
since 1970. The 1977 Bureau of Labor Statistics showed 48.9% of women
over 16 years of age in the work force. Women made up 42% of the whole
labor force with totals of 40.5 million women versus 57.2 million men.50
The rapid surge of women into the labor market can be attributed to
41 118 CONG. REC. 9332 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). The authors of Sex Discrimination and
the Law commented on Senator Bayh's statement:,
At the end of his statement, Senator Bayh quoted a letter from Colonel Stella Levy
of the Israeli Armed forces, which said that women in that country did not actually
engage in combat, nor did they receive the same combat training as men. The senator
implied that the same conditions could prevail in American armed forces were the
amendment to pass. This position illustrates the tendency of advocates of the amend-
ment, of whom Bayh was the most ardent, to "waffle" on the issue of equal military
service for women. Apparently they were themselves uncomfortable with the idea of
women in combat, or at least saw this as the most politically sensitive question of ERA
interpretation.
CAUSES, supra note 2, at 166.
, See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 977.
"Id. /
Address by Melissa A. Thompson, Legislative Coordinator for the National Orgpn'ization
for Women (April 18, 1977), reprinted in CONG. DIG. 182 (1977).
60 N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
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a variety of economic, demographic, technological and social forces.
Women marry later, have fewer children, divorce more frequently, have
longer life spans, outnumber men in undergraduate colleges, and are enter-
ing professional schools, such as law and medicine, in increasing numbers.
Other factors suggested by experts are inflation requiring the wife to assist
in maintaining a style of life, the break-up of families compelling many
mothers to find their own means of support, and the women's movement
which motivated many women to seek full independence.5'
As more and more women enter the work force, employment increases
in importance as a vital focus of the movement for equal rights between
men and women. Paradoxically, much of the discrimination against work-
ing women which the movement seeks to eliminate flowed from labor laws
originally passed to protect women. In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, states passed numerous protective laws which restricted
the occupations which women could enter and regulated the conditions of
their employment. Many labor laws granted benefits to women only, such
as minimum wages, day of rest, rest periods, meal periods, special rest-
rooms, separate lunchrooms and seats at assembly lines. Other statutes
specifically excluded women from certain types of employment, such as
mining and bartending, or regulated certain conditions of employment of
women, such as maximum number of hours per day and week, night work,
prohibition of lifting of weights above a certain maximum and prohibition
from working for a determined period before and after childbirth.
Since the 1950's, many observers have viewed such "protective" laws
more as liabilities than assets since often they tend to have a discrimina-
tory impact upon women. The inequities thus created in the labor market
were evident from the higher earning power of men, the higher rate of
unemployment for women, the lower status in seniority of women, and,
finally, the lower percentage of women obtaining professional jobs or other
positions offering significant opportunities for advancement.
Both supporters and opponents of the ERA agree that most of the sex-
based discrimination in the area of employment has been eliminated
through present legislation and court decisions. The result is that passage
of the Amendment will have little impact in this area of employment and
will be largely symbolic. 2
Approval of the Amendment, however, would remove the vestiges of
sex-based discriminatory legislation and practices in the labor field and
also confirm the equality between sexes already achieved. It is helpful,
therefore, to list the effects on labor laws and practices that would flow
from the ERA keeping in mind that most of these effects have already been
accomplished.
51 Id.
52 See IMPACT ERA, supra note 5, at 93-94; Ferrell, supra note 7, at 875.
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General Impact of ERA on Labor Laws
The guiding principle of the Amendment, that both sexes be treated
equally, demands extension of employment legislation to both sexes or
invalidation of the laws for everyone. Laws which are discriminatory, re-
strictive, exclusionary in regard to one sex will be invalidated. Similarly
laws which confer benefits or privileges to women will probably be ex-
tended to men.n In cases where the extension of benefits or privileges to
both sexes would be industrially or economically disruptive, equality
would require total elimination of the benefits or privileges.54 While the
ERA will not directly affect discrimination in private employment, it will
have an impact on private employment through state laws and through the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 55
Specific Impact of ERA on Labor Laws"
Pregnancy-related disability of working women will be treated like any
other disability in regard to disability insurance or in regard to any other
areas of employment. The ERA will compel repeal of laws and regulations
requiring pregnant women to terminate working for certain periods before
and after childbirth. Maternity leave will. hinge on women's desire or abil-
ity to work. Since child-rearing is not unique to women, men will have the
option to take child-care leave.
The ERA would invalidate any workers' compensation laws granting
death or disability benefits exclusively to one sex or which would automati-
cally award dependency benefits to women while not awarding similar
benefits to men unless dependency was proved. The Amendment will nul-
lify statutes which grant public pension benefits only to widows of public
employees, laws excluding women from such jobs as bartending and min-
ing, and regulations which discriminate against one sex on the basis of
customer preference, viz., female attendants on airlines, lingerie sales
clerks. In addition, practices which have traditionally excluded one sex
from certain employment where the discrimination was not based on a
unique physical characteristic of one sex will be invalidated. Thus, the
ERA would not permit employment of resident managers of apartment
houses to be restricted to married couples, nor would it allow the exclusion
of women as part of truck driver teams even though the wives of the male
u See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 15; Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 927, 936;
cf. ScHLAFLY, supra note 22, at 113 (holding that benefits will not be extended).
u See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 874; Hillman, supra note 31, at 817.
8 See WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 220; Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 926 n.107;
Hillman, supra note 31, at 790-92.
N See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 215, 221-22; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 226, 228-42,
254; Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 929, 932-36; Elsen, Coogan, Ginsburg, Men,
Women, and the Constitution: The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 COLUM. J.L. Soc. POB. 77,
79-80 (1973); Ferrell, supra note 7, at 876; Hillman, supra note 31, at 799-800, 808-09, 824-
29; League of Women Voters of New York State, ERA Campaign Kit 34 (1975).
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drivers objected. Moreover, it has been suggested that in regard to statutes
extending job preferences to veterans, the Amendment will probably re-
quire either the repeal of all such veterans' preferences or a broader appli-
cation of such preferences to include the spouses of the veterans.57
The foregoing list of effects of the ERA constitutes the thrust of its
proponents' arguments with respect to employment. Their position is sum-
marized in the Senate majority report:
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment will result in equal treatment
for men and women with respect to the labor laws of the States, as in other
legal matters. This will mean that such restrictive discriminatory labor laws
as those which bar women entirely from certain occupations will be invalid.
But those laws which confer a real benefit, which offer real protection, will,
it is expected, be extended to protect both men and women."
Opponents of the ERA argue that there is no necessity for the Amend-
ment since equality of rights in the area of employment has, for all practi-
cal purposes, been achieved. Among the measures adopted by Congress
designed to prohibit discrimination on account of sex are the following:
1. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended,59 prohibits discrimina-
tion because of sex with respect to payment of wages for work that requires
equal skill, effort, or responsibility and that is performed under equal
working conditions.
2. Civil Rights Act of 196410 - Title VII of the Act prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to hiring, job classifi-
cation, promotion, compensation, fringe benefits, and discharge unless sex
is a "bona fide occupational qualification." Title VII's coverage includes
any private employer who employes fifteen or more persons.
3. The Nurse Training Act of 19711 requires nondiscrimination on
the basis of sex for entrance to all federally assisted schools in the health
professions.
4. The Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 19712 pro-
hibits the use of federal funds for health profession programs which dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Schools of medicine, osteopathy, dentistry,
veterinary, optometry, pharmacy, podiatry, public health, and nursing are
subject to this prohibition.
5. The Higher Education Act of 197211 - Title IX extends the Equal
Pay Act to all employees of educational institutions and prohibits discrimi-
nation because of sex in all federally assisted education programs.
17 The problem with extension of benefits to spouses of veterans is that both receive the
preferences - a double reward for service only by one. But see BINGMAN, supra note 6, at
221.
58 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 15.
' 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1976).
' 42 U.S.C. § 296 (1976).
62 Id. § 292b.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1003, 1005a, 1006-1-11, 1021-1024, 1027, 1031, 1033, 1034, 1041, 1042,
1051-56, 1061 (1976).
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6. Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 19724 - The Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission is established by Act to file suit
against employers who discriminate because of sex.
7. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 19735 pro-
hibits discrimination because of sex, race, creed, color, national origins, or
political affiliation with regard to both employees of the program and
recipients of its benefits.
Elimination through existing legislation of almost all sex-based dis-
crimination in the field of employment is admitted by most proponents of
the ERA. Proponents contend, however, that the ERA is still needed as a
symbol of equal rights in labor and also to insure that discriminatory
legislation is not reinstated."6
While those supporting the ERA are almost unanimous in admitting
that the goal of legal equality for working women has been achieved, they
argue that in fact there is still discrimination against women in the labor
market regarding wages, promotions, hiring and discharge. Those opposed
to the Amendment retort that if women are not enjoying the full benefit
of legislation which has granted equality to workers of both sexes, it is the
result of inadequate enforcement and not the lack of fair laws and regula-
tions. The ERA will not necessarily affect enforcement. The Amendment
is not self-enforcing. Women will still be obliged to sue in court to enforce
their rights with no more remedies than are presently available. "7
VI. FAMILY AND THE ERA
General Observations
Under English common law from which our state laws concerning the
family are principally derived, a woman who married lost most of her legal
rights. She could no longer make contracts, sue or be sued, manage or
control her property. Blackstone wrote:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law. . . the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing,
protection and cover she performs everything . . . . Upon this principle of a
union of person in husband and wife depend almost all the legal rights,
duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by marriage. 8
04 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5315, 5316 (1976); 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-
9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (1976).
5 18 U.S.C. § 665 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802, 811-22, 841-51, 871-75, 881-85, 911-29, 951-
56, 981-92 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (1976).
" See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 16; BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 204-05; WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 217; M. RAWALT, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW 6 (1976); IMPACT ERA, supra note 5, at 95; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, IN PURSUIT OF EQUAL RIGHTS: WOMEN IN THE SEvENTIEs 6 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as IN PURsurr OF EQUAL RIGHTS]; Bayh, supra note 14, at 13; Ferrell, supra note 7, at
873.
" See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 28-29.
" 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (6th ed. 1774).
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This common law fiction meant, for all practical purposes, that the
wife had no legal identity.
During the late 19th century, aspects of this exclusive patriarchal
authority during marriage were removed by passage of various state laws
recognizing the rights of married women to their own earnings and separate
property. This change was probably prompted by a marked increase in the
number of women and children working in factories to help meet the needs
of the family.
As conditions improved in the 20th century, larger numbers of women
were not obliged to work and found themselves in a situation where their
exclusive role was the care of a household and children. The housewife-
and-maintenance marriage became the popular model and the law began
to develop ways to protect the family unit and insure rights for each part-
ner.
Today, there is a continuing movement directed toward achieving a
partnership marriage in which the wife would have equal rights with the
husband. According to some authors, "the effect of the Equal Rights
Amendment on marriage and divorce law will be to move the law more
directly, more forcefully and more expeditiously in the direction it is al-
ready going.""
The effects on the family of this movement was the subject of a series
of articles last November in the New York Times, which enumerated the
following changes in the modem family: 0 the divorce rate has doubled in
the last 10 years; two out of five children born in this decade will live in
single parent homes for at least part of their youth; the number of house-
holds headed by women has increased by more than thirty-three per cent
in this decade and more than doubled in one generation; more than one-
half of all mothers with school-age children now work outside the home,
as do more than one-third of mothers with children under three years of
age; one out of every three schoolchildren lives in a home headed by only
one parent or relative; day care of irregular quality is replacing the paren-
tal role in many working families; there has been an extraordinary growth
in the number of "latchkey" children, that is, children unsupervised for
portions of the day, usually in the period between the end of school and
the working parent's return home; the average number of children per
family dropped from a high of 3.8 in 1957 to 2.04 in 1977, signifying a
further constriction of the natural nuclear family but an expansion of legal
kinships through divorce and remarriage.
What the general impact of the ERA will be on the family has been
described differently by the two camps. Proponents foresee the Amend-
ment instrumental in creating an ideal situation where husband and wife
are completely equal and causing great blessings to flow from this egali-
tarian partnership. One proponent wrote: "An ERA future is a world of
" Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 937.
7o Men and Women, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27-30, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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changed reproductive needs and this change will affect an ever-widening
circle of other institutional needs and demands. The benefits to both men
and women of a strengthened and more viable union between them are, in
and of themselves, incalculable."'"
Other proponents see the Amendment as a final liberation of women
with the community assuming more and more the responsibility of provid-
ing care for the children. Only with the assistance of government-funded
day care centers, they maintain, can women attain equal opportunities in
life, in marriage, and in employment."
Opponents, on the other hand, see a bleaker future for the family if
the ERA receives the necessary two-thirds ratification. Professor Ryman
of Drake University Law School concluded a study he made on family
property rights and the ERA:
[lilt seems probable that many states will adopt a wildly permissive ap-
proach should the proposed Amendment be adopted. This would minimize
legal reinforcement of cultural, mores supportive of family life, tend to de-
grade the homemaker role, and support economic development requiring
women to seek careers. Plato's concept of common women and common
children (public child care is implied by degrading the homemaker role) may
not be far away. It remains to be decided whether that is an improvement in
the status of women. It seems clear that a cultural revolution of proportions
beyond the ken of the proponents of the Amendment is implied."
In testimony before a Senate Committee, Dr. Jonathan H. Pincus,
Professor at Yale Medical School, prophesied a negative future for the
family resulting from the Amendment: "I would predict that the Equal
Rights Amendment and many of the other goals of its proponents will bring
social disruption, unhappiness and increasing rates of divorce and deser-
tion. Weakening of family ties may also lead to increased rates of alcohol-
ism, suicide and possible sexual deviation."'"
The possible consequences of the Amendment on family life have
occasioned more controversy than any other issue. We consider now some
of the more specific areas of family law which involve sex discrimination
and upon which the ERA will surely have an impact.
Age of Marriage
As of 1977, twenty-three states had statutes establishing different ages
at which men and women could marry with or without parental consent.
Traditionally, marriage laws permitted girls to marry at 16 with the con-
sent of their parents and at 18 without such consent. Boys, on the other
IMPAcT ERA, supra note 5, at 141.
" Lexcen, supra note 34, at 256-57; Ohio Task Force for the Implementation of the Equal
Rights Amendment, Report 18 (1975); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Sex Bias in the U.S.
Code 214 (1977).
" Ryman, A Comment on Family Property Rights and the Proposed 27th Amendment, 22
DRAKE L. REV. 505, 514 (1973).
11 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 48.
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hand, were allowed to marry at 18 with parental consent and at 21 without
it. Passage of the ERA will invalidate all laws which establish different
ages for marriage depending'on sex and require that-the age at which a
person can marry be the same -Vr both sexes."5
Domicile of Wife
"The common law rule concerning a wife's domicile provided that upon
marriage the wife's domicile was that of her husband. In addition, the wife
was obliged to follow him if his choice of a new domicile was reasonable.
Her refusal to accompany him was regarded as desertion or abandonment.
This common law rule is still the law in many states.
Domicile affects many legal rights of a wife, such as tuition at state
universities, jury service, taxes, voter registration, jurisdiction of courts in
lawsuits, jurisdiction over estates, welfare and running for public office.
The ERA would render unconstitutional any laws which determine
domicile for women in a manner different from men. It would, in other
words, allow the husband and wife to establish separate domiciles. Fur-
thermore, the ERA would invalidate statutes entailing that refusal of a
wife to follow her husband would constitute desertion or abandonment
unless the same consequence held for husbands who refused to accompany
their wives to a new location."6
Domicile of Children
In all states, the domicile of children born to married parents follows
that of the father. The domicile of children born out of wedlock is that of
the mother.
Passage of the ERA would invalidate all such rules since the determi-
nation of the child's domicile is based on the sex of one person. Writers
offer several solutions, such as allowing children over a certain age to
choose their own domicile, while the actual residence of children below
that age would control, or adopting actual residence in all cases, or using
the criterion which serves the "best interest of the child.""
Change of Name at Marriage18
At the time of marriage, the traditional practice has been for women
to give up their surname and assume that of their husband. To a limited
7' See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 172; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 101; Constitutional
Basis, supra note 5, at 938-39; Conlin, supra note 35, at 326.
7 See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 172; WoMEN's RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 113; Constitutional
Basis, supra note 5, at 941.
" See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 174; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 116-17;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 942-43.
7" See WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 102-08; ScHLALY, supra note 23, at 92-93;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 940; Conlin, supra note 35, at 281-84.
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degree, women are also expected in marriage to be addressed under their
husband's first name.
The common law rule, which still holds in most states, permits a
person even though married, to use any name he or she chooses as long as
it is not done to deceive or defraud. Hawaii is the only state that requires
by statute that a woman assume at marriage the name of her husband.
In spite of the common law rule, many states have enacted statutes
that presume that the wife has taken the name of her husband. These laws
provide, for example, that a name change by a husband automatically
changes the name of his wife and children, that a wife use her husband's
name for voting, for vehicle registration and for exercising other rights of
citizenship, and that divorced women may be permitted by an order to
resume their prior surname.
The ERA would make unconstitutional any statute which requires
that a wife assume the name of her husband. Invalid also would be any
statutory rules, such as in registration and licensing procedures, that pre-
sume that a wife has taken her husband's name.
Under the Amendment, the husband and wife could each retain their
own names as before marriage, or they could decide to use the same name
which could be the name of the husband, or that of the wife, or a combina-
tion of both, or a completely new name. In addition, the state could require
the husband and wife to use the same name provided the husband and wife
were allowed to choose what the same name would be.
Children's Names"9
State regulations generally require that a child of married parents
have the name of the father while a child of unmarried parents is tradition-
ally given the name of the mother. The ERA will invalidate any rule
requiring that a child automatically be given the surname of one parent
or granting to one parent the sole authority to choose the child's name. It
will be the combined decision of both parents which will determine the
surname of children. In the case of a child born out of wedlock and where
paternity has not been established, the mother will choose the name of the
child and she will be free to choose any name. Furthermore, the Amend-
ment will nullify any regulation which requires children to continue using
their father's or mother's name throughout minority. Minors of sufficient
age and maturity would be allowed to change their name on their own
authority or object to a change of name sought by one or both parents.
After a divorce, courts are generally hesitant to allow a divorced woman
to change the name of the children to her maiden name or to that of their
step-father. The ERA would give the mother as much right to decide the
children's name as the father. The Amendment, however, would provide
7o See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 173; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 108-11;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 941.
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no help for the resolution of conflicts between the parents as to choice of
name for their child.
Consortium8
0
Consortium is the term given to the right of one spouse to the love,
affection, companionship, society and sexual relations of the other spouse.
At common law, only the male spouse could sue for the loss of consortium
as a result of a negligent injury to his wife by a third party. The wife had
no right to sue for loss of services of her husband. As a result of court
decisions and legislative action, this discrimination based on sex has been
eliminated in all but six states which still retain the common law rule. The
ERA would invalidate statutes that limited the cause of action for loss of
consortium to the husband. Either the cause of action must be extended
to both spouses or be completely eliminated.
It should be pointed out that the Amendment would not tolerate the
sex-based definitions of conjugal function which is the basis for the com-
mon law rule on consortium. Thus, it could not be assumed that women
have a juridical obligation to do housework or to provide affection and
companionship and sexual relations unless the husbands were under an
equal obligation.
Marital Property"'
Upon marriage, the financial status of the wife is changed significantly
depending on the laws on marital property of the state in which she and
her husband live. Two different systems of laws on marital property co-
exist in the United States-the common law system and the community
property system. The wife's rights in both Systems mature primarily with
the death or separation of her husband.
The common law system holds in forty-two states. Under this system,
each spouse retains full ownership and management of any earnings or
property which he or she may acquire during the marriage. The other
spouse has no legal right or interest in this property. In the same way, all
property which either spouse brought to the marriage or inherited remains
the distinct property of the spouse owning it and that same spouse retains
sole management and control of it. Under this system, therefore, the rights
of ownership and control of earnings and property of either spouse remain
legally the same after the marriage as they were before.
The sex-discriminatory aspect of the common law system is most ap-
parent in cases where the wife does not work. While she may be rendering
50 See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 173; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 118-19;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 943-44; Conlin, supra note 35, at 277-78.
11 See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 161-62; WoMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 165-66; IMPACT
ERA, supra note 5, at 116-24; IN PURSUIT OF EQUAL RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 9-10;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 946-49; Ferrell, supra note 7, at 889-90; Ryman, supra
note 73, at 503-14.
THE ERA
the valuable services of housekeeping and child-rearing, the employed hus-
band retains full ownership and control of his income. She can acquire an
interest in his earnings only if he makes a gift to her by placing the prop-
erty jointly in both names or in her name alone.
The community property system exists in eight states. Similar to the
common law system, each spouse retains the ownership and control of
property brought to the marriage or inherited during it. Unlike that sys-
tem, all earnings of either spouse acquired during the marriage become
community property of both so that each spouse has a one-half interest in
that property. The one-half interest in the earnings of one spouse would
belong to the other spouse even if the latter were unemployed. Since 1972,
six of these community property states have given to the wife equal right
of control over the property.
The property rights of a wife who survives her husband vary according
to the state controlling the inheritance. Without describing all the possible
variations, it can be said that in nearly all common law system states,
some protection is given to the surviving wife. The trend is toward giving
her the "widow's right of election" by which she receives absolute owner-
ship of one-third to one-half of all the property owned by her husband at
the time of death, regardless of any provision in his will.
In the eight community property states, a widow receives her one-half
ownership interest in the community property. Her husband is able, just
as she is, to bequeath his one-half interest to anyone he wants.
In cases of divorce, many courts under the common law system have
the discretionary power to divide the property equitably where the wife has
no vested property rights in her husband's earnings. In all eight of the
community property states, the law requires a division of property upon
divorce, generally resulting in equal shares.
The ERA will invalidate all laws concerning marital property which
discriminate against one sex, such as those relating to the management
and control of property during marriage and the distribution of property
upon death or divorce. Laws which give a special protection to surviving
wives, such as the "widow's right of election", would be either declared
invalid or be extended to the surviving husband. Property division upon
divorce must be based on sex-neutral criteria focusing on the financial
circumstances, needs and earning abilities of the parties.
The ERA will not mandate any particular system of marital property
rights. Many authors suggest that the most acceptable approach would be
adoption in all states of the community property system provided that
both spouses have equal management of the property. 2
Family Support
In all states, the primary responsibility for support of the wife rests
12 See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 162-63; WOMEN'S RImHTS, supra note 7, at 187-90;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 944-95; Conlin, supra note 35, at 275, 331-32.
24 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1979
on the husband. In many states, the wife is never obligated to support her
husband, while in about sixteen states the wife is liable to support her
husband only if he is incapacitated or indigent. This obligation of the
husband to support his wife is reinforced in many jurisdictions by criminal
non-support laws. Moreover, it is independent of the wealth of the wife and
cannot be eliminated or diminished by an agreement between the spouses.
All fifty states give primary responsibility to the father to support
children of the marriage. In most jurisdictions, the mother is legally liable
to support the children only if the father fails or refuses to support them.
Criminal non-support laws will penalize either father or mother who fails
in his or her duty to support the children.8 3
While the law places the primary responsibility of support on the
husband, in practice his obligation is rarely enforced since courts have
been reluctant to interfere with existing marriages. Realistically enforce-
able are the so-called "necessaries" laws enacted in many states. These
laws require one spouse, typically the husband, to pay a merchant for such
necessaries as food, clothing or shelter purchased by the other spouse either
for the use of the purchasing spouse or for their children.
The family support responsibility of the husband continues after di-
vorce through alimony for his former wife and support payments for the
children. Studies have shown that reality does not always conform to the
legal duty. Alimony is awarded in only ten per cent of divorce cases and
even when awarded frequently it cannot be collected. Although child sup-
port by the father is decreed in practically every case where the mother
receives custody, forty-two per cent of the fathers default in the first year
and by the tenth year, seventy-nine per cent are in total noncompliance. 4
Finally, it should be noted that in an ongoing marriage, the law as-
sumes that the wife, in return for the husband's protection and support,
will fulfill her part of the marital contract which is to perform the domestic
services and rear the children. In the area of family support, passage of the
ERA will have a broad impact. Statutes which place the husband as head
of the household would be unconstitutional. The Amendment would inval-
idate provisions assigning specific roles to the husband and wife within the
family. Thus, it would nullify the duty of the wife to be the husband's
companion, to carry out household and domestic services, and to rear
children, for instance, unless these same obligations were required of the
husband. On the other hand, it would invalidate the legal obligation of the
husband which assigns him the primary responsibility of family support.
Thus, family support would become the equal responsibility of both de-
pending on resources, earning power and non-monetary contributions to
the family welfare, especially homemaking and childcare services. The
13 IMPACT ERA, supra note 5, at 189-90; Ferrell, supra note 7, at 886.
" See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 157-82; THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT LAWS, CmzrN's ADviSORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 1-11 (1972);
KRAUSKOPF, LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 6.
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Amendment would invalidate criminal non-support laws penalizing only
men for non-support of their wives, although criminal nonsupport laws
which oblige both mothers and fathers to support children would remain.
Finally, the Amendment would require that alimony be equally available
to both husbands and wives.15 In short, the ERA eliminates the legal duties
that presently constitute the marriage contract and requires that the mari-
tal responsibilities of each spouse be based on individual abilities and
needs rather than on the sex of the parties.
Opponents of the ERA agree with the foregoing statement concerning
the impact of the Amendment on family support. However, they see cer-
tain deleterious implications and consequences flowing from this impact.
Since the ERA would invalidate laws requiring the husband to be the
primary supporter and would require both spouses to assume the responsi-
bility, it places an unfair burden on the woman who would have the double
responsibility of financial motherhood and homemaking. According to the
opposition, equal application of the support obligation under the ERA
would enable an irresponsible husband to refuse to work or assume any
domestic duties. In such an instance, if the wife takes a job to support her
children, she would also have the legal obligation to support her irresponsi-
ble husband and, in fact, she would be subject to criminal penalties if she
did not support him and pay his debts. Under the Amendment, it will not
be a crime for a husband to abandon his wife. In short, opponents foresee
a devastating effect on the family structure and on the present legal rights
of the wife. 8
Child Custody
Upon dissolution of a marriage, a crucial question concerns custody
of the children. Most courts today utilize the "best interests of the child"
test as the standard of their decisions. In spite of this criterion, however,
many presumptions regarding the ability of parents exist. In most states,
the mother is preferred in custody proceedings involving children of tender
years. The factual result of statutes, presumptions and custom favoring the
mother is that mothers are given custody in ninety-five per cent of child
custody cases.87
Under the ERA, judicial preference for mothers would be unconstitu-
tional, and sex-neutral standards for awarding custody must be employed.
The Amendment would prohibit all statutory and common law presump-
tions based on sex which would determine which parent was the more
suitable guardian.88
83 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 17; IN PURSUIT OF EQUAL RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 5;
Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 945-46; Ferrell, supra note 7, at 888-89.
u See SCHLAFLY, supra note 23, at 70-81.
8? See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 157; Kanowitz, The Male Stake in Women's Liberation, 8
CALIF. W.L. REV. 424, 428 (1972).
u See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 195-200; KRAUSKOPF, supra note 84, at 7-8; Constitutional
Basis, supra note 5, at 953; Conlin, supra note 35, at 289-92.
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Courts frequently deny custody to a mother if it is borne out that she
was guilty of adultery or misconduct, while they often do not bar the father
for similar improper behavior. Under the ERA, courts could not consider
misconduct which did not affect that parent's relationship with the child. 9
Some opponents of the ERA see harmful effects in the mandate of the
Amendment that custody of children be based on equality of the sexes.
"Equality might mean that the courts would award one child to the mother
and one to the father. Or it might mean that the courts would award
custody to the father in approximately half the cases, ordering the mother
to pay child support." 0
Grounds for Divorce or Annulment
One out of every three marriages ends in divorce or civil annulment
and the rate is increasing. The trend today in divorce laws is inexorably
toward "no fault" divorce, that is, where "irretrievable breakdown" of the
marriage will be the sole or an additional ground for divorce. The most
common grounds of divorce admittedly are sex-neutral. In some states,
however, vestiges of sex-discriminatory grounds of divorce or annulment
remain. For example, a husband may obtain a divorce if his wife was
pregnant at the time of their wedding without his knowledge or collusion.
A wife may obtain a divorce if her husband was addicted to drugs but he
may not divorce his wife for the same reason. A wife may divorce her
husband for drunkenness alone, for non-support, as a result of his va-
grancy, due to his having been a notoriously licentious person before the
marriage or because of his indignities to her person. A husband may di-
vorce his wife if she refuses to move with him to another location, or due
to her having been a notorious prostitute before the marriage.9
The ERA will invalidate all grounds for divorce or annulment which
apply to only one sex or will require the extension of such grounds to the
other spouse. For example, non-support by the husband would be elimi-
nated as grounds for divorce by the wife or it would be extended to the
husband so that he could sue his wife for divorce if she failed in her
responsibility to support him. The ERA would likewise invalidate statutes
that granted the husband a divorce because at the time of the marriage
he did not know that his wife was pregnant by another man, or it would
allow the wife grounds for divorce if at the time of the marriage she did
not know that her husband had impregnated another woman.
The other approach that would be acceptable under the ERA would
be the substitution of no-fault grounds for divorce whereby the sole ground
would be the "irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage or "irreconcilable
differences." 2
1, See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 197.
90 ScHLAFLY, supra note 23, at 82-83.
" See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 180-82; WoMEN's RIGHTs, supra note 7, at 184; Conlin, supra
note 35, at 284-85; Positive Panacea, supra note 41, at 980-81.
92 See BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 180, Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 951.
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VII. HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE ERA
A controversial issue between proponents and opponents of the ERA
is whether or not the Amendment would require legalization of marriage
between persons of the same sex. The many benefits conferred on married
couples motivate homosexuals and lesbians to seek legal recognition of
their unions. Married persons, for example, enjoy the right to file joint
income tax returns, gift tax exemptions and deductions, estate tax marital
deduction, the right to inherit from one's spouse, the privilege not to testify
against one's spouse, tort recovery for wrongful death of one's spouse, the
ability to adopt children, eligibility for family insurance policies, social
security survivor's benefits and numerous other rights and privileges. In
addition to legal benefits, marriage would confer acceptance and respect-
ability sought by many homosexuals.
Proponents of the ERA hold that the Amendment does not demand
any change in state laws forbidding marriage between homosexuals. States
may legislate against marriage between two men as long as it also forbids
marriage between two women. Similarly, under the Amendment "if a state
permits single sex marriage between two males it must likewise permit
such marriage between two females.""
Several of the leading proponents of the ERA, including Senator Birch
Bayh and Professor Thomas I. Emerson of Yale Law School, reaffirm the
position that state laws prohibiting marriage between members of the
same sex would not be invalidated by the Amendment and that the
Amendment would not require recognition of the validity of homosexual
marriages.
The equal rights amendment would not prohibit a State from saying that the
institution of marriage would be prohibited to men partners. It would not
prohibit a State from saying the institution of marriage would be prohibited
from two women partners. All it says is that if a State legislature makes a
judgment that it is wrong for a man to marry a man, then it must say it is
wrong for a woman to marry a woman - or if a State says it is wrong for a
woman to marry a woman, then it must say it is wrong for a man to marry a
man.",
In support of their interpretation of the ERA on this issue, adherents of
the Amendment have received corroboration from the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington. Washington has its own equal rights amendment
and its Supreme Court in 1974 held that the state law prohibiting same
sex marriages does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and furthermore, it ruled that its decision was supported by
both the state equal rights amendment, and the proposed federal ERA. "
In brief, the proponents are insistent that the Amendment relates
solely to gender, not to the sexual orientation of a man or woman. Distinc-
13 RAWALT, supra note 66, at 6.
gj 118 CONG. REC. 9331 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
" Singer v. Harris, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
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tions on sexual orientation would be prohibited only to the degree that they
treat men and women differently. As long as all homosexuals are treated
equally, there is no sex discrimination."
Opponents of the ERA, on the contrary, argue that the Amendment
will require the legal recognition of marriages between persons of the same
sex. The testimony of Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School before
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1971 is quoted in the Senate Report:
"Indeed, if the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is
toward race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between mem-
bers of the same sex would be as invalid as laws forbidding miscegena-
tion."97 In the same report, Professor James White of the Michigan Law
School, speaking against the Amendment, noted that the ERA would re-
sult in litigation on the sexual requirements of the marriage ceremony and
that "conceivably a court would find that the State had to authorize mar-
riage and recognize marital legal rights between members of the same
sex."'
Two articles in law school journals give further support to the opinion
that the ERA will require legalization of homosexual marriages. An article
in the University of California, Davis Law Review argues that the wording
of the ERA seems to demand recognition of homosexual marriages but that
in fact the courts will probably not interpret it in that manner:
There can be no more literal example of denying rights "on account of sex"
than denying marriage to same sex couples because of the genitals of the
applicants ...
* Thus, even though the wording of the amendment lends merit to the
argument that it would compel recognition of same sex marriage, courts are
not likely to so interpret the amendment because of the physical differences
of the sexes and because of the intent of Congress.' 9
A 1973 Yale Law Journal article analyzed the general question of the
legality of homosexual marriage. Relating the discussion to the ERA, the
author concluded that under the Amendment it would not be possible to
deny marriage to homosexuals:
The legislative history of the Amendment clearly supports the interpretation
that sex is to be an impermissible legal classification, that rights are not to
be abridged on the basis of sex. A statute or administrative policy which
permits a man to marry a woman, subject to certain regulatory restrictions,
but categorically denies him the right to marry another man clearly entails
a classification along sexual lines ...
With no relevant or countervailing interests to place against the rule of
" See CAUSES, supra note 2, at 179-80; K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 112-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DISCRIMI-
NATION].
, S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 47.
,Id.
" Sullivan, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 291, 293 (1973).
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"absolute" equality of treatment, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
should be interpreted as prohibiting the uniform denial of marriage licenses
to same-sex couples.'"
Professor Charles E. Rice of Notre Dame Law School also predicts the
legitimacy of homosexual marriages under the ERA. In testimony before
joint committees of the Indiana legislature, he stated: "The inflexible judi-
cial scrutiny that would be required by the ERA is the reason for the well-
grounded expectation that the ERA would require, among other things,
. . .that homosexual marriages be treated the same as heterosexual."' 0',
In the light of the controversy over whether the ERA will require the
legalization of homosexual marriages, it is significant to note that the
canons in the present Code of Canon Law on the nature of and consent
required for marriage use sex-neutral terms. Canon 1012 speaks of the
matrimonial contract between baptized "persons". Canon 1081 describes
marriage as resulting from "consent of the parties lawfully manifested
between legally capable persons." Such sex-neutral wording may be used
to argue for recognition by the Church of marriages between parties of the
same sex, even though the whole context of the law on marriage presup-
poses that it is a special relationship between a man and a woman. Possi-
bly to avoid any such challenge, the scheme of the Proposed Revised Code
explicitly describes marriage as resulting from the "consent between a man
and a woman."
VIII. ABORTION AND THE ERA
Among the more volatile debates on the impact of the ERA concerns
the question of the consequences of the passage of the Amendment on
abortion legislation. There have been repeated accusations with equally
vociferous denials concerning the effect of the ERA on the ability of the
states to pass abortion laws, on efforts to achieve passage of a Human
Rights Amendment and on the possibility of obtaining Supreme Court
reversal of its 1973 abortion decisions in Roe v. Wade'02 and Doe v.
Bolton. 10
In this particular controversy, the line of demarcation between the two
camps is not clearly drawn. It would be unfair to classify every person in
favor of the ERA as a pro-abortionist or to conclude that every pro-lifer is
against the ERA. It is our intention to list the prophecies of those who deny
a close relationship between the ERA and abortion and of those who see a
close connection between the two.
In its newsletter, ERA Yes, the League of Women Voters responded
to the accusations of opponents who claimed that the Amendment would
repeal all and every kind of future anti-abortion law. The newsletter la-
'0 Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583, 588 (1973).
101 Rice, supra note 27, at 2.
102 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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beled the charge a red-herring and argued to the contrary first, that the
Supreme Court's 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade in effect overturned all state
laws which prohibited a woman from voluntarily terminating her preg-
nancy in the first trimester period. Thus, the liberalization of abortion
laws, it was contended, had begun in the absence of the ERA which Con-
gress approved in 1972. Second, from a legal standpoint, the newsletter
stated, there is no direct connection between the ERA and abortion. Two
separate legal principles are involved. The right to privacy implicitly em-
bodied in the Constitution was used by the Court to justify a woman's
decision to terminate pregnancy. The principle of equal protection of the
laws was not an issue in the abortion decision.'
Often cited by those who deny a connection between the ERA and
abortion is a statement by J. William Heckman. As Chief Counsel for the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, he commented in
February 1974 on the ERA and abortion:
That decision [Roe v. Wade] was based on the right to privacy which,
though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Court held to be
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....
The Equal Rights Amendment, on the other hand, has nothing to do with
privacy or the Due Process Clause; rather it is concerned with equal protec-
tion of the laws .... Since abortion by its nature only concerns women, sex
discrimination in this area is a biological impossibility. The proposed 27th
Amendment, if ratified, would have no applicability whatever to the question
of abortion.'°0
The legislative history of the ERA reveals very little on this question
of abortion. The leading sponsor of the Amendment in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, responded on the House
floor to a direct question as to the effect of the ERA on state abortion laws
that "the equal rights amendment has absolutely no effect on any abortion
law of any State."'0 6
Among the leading authors who foresee deleterious effects on abortion
with passage of ERA is Professor Charles Rice of Notre Dame Law School.
In a statement at a joint hearing of two committees of the Indiana legisla-
ture on January 4, 1977, he stated that if the ERA were adopted, it may
disable the states from imposing on abortion any restrictions whatsoever
more severe than those placed on sexually neutral operations such as ap-
pendectomies or gall bladder removals. Another devastating, but likely
effect of the ERA in the abortion area, Professor Rice continued, would be
on the conscience laws which have been enacted in various jurisdictions.
The ERA would very probably prevent the states from affording this pro-
tection to the consciences of doctors and nurses. A doctor or nurse in a
,01 League of Women Voters, ERA Yes, No. 6, at 2 (1975).
15 Quoted in ERA Campaign Kit, supra note 66, at 42; ERA Yes, supra note 104, at 2; In
Pursuit of Equal Rights, supra note 66, at 17.
10 117 CONG. REc. 35,302 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths).
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public or quasi-public hospital setting could well be compelled, under the
ERA, to perform or participate in abortions, notwithstanding his or her
religious objections. Rice concluded that while it is true that the adoption
of the ERA could not legally prevent the subsequent adoption of a Human
Life Amendment to prohibit abortion, the ERA's prohibition against sex-
ual distinctions would survive the adoption of a Human Life Amendment
and would becloud the interpretation of that amendment. 07
Professor Joseph Witherspoon of the University of Texas Law School
likewise foresees the possibility of a direct impact of the ERA on abortion.
In a 1975 memorandum on the Amendment, he wrote:
My main objection to ERA, however, is that it is at least ambiguous relative
to whether or not it outlaws anti-abortion legislation and permits mothers
and their physicians to kill their unborn children. It is my opinion that the
Supreme Court might well construe ERA as providing an additional constitu-
tional provision requiring the result it reached in its 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade.1 0
Former Senator Sam Ervin is quoted by several sources as in agree-
ment with the position that the ERA will consolidate the alleged right of
women to abortion: "ERA will give every woman a Constitutional right to
have an abortion at will.""'
Clarence Manion, former Dean of Notre Dame Law School, wrote:
"With ERA in the Constitution, State anti-abortion laws, since they are
designed on the basis of sex, would be a violation of the ERA... [as they
are] essentially sexist and cannot be applied to men."",
Professor John T. Noonan, Jr. is concerned about the pro-abortion
interpretation that would be given to the ERA by the federal judiciary.
Professor Noonan warned:
The chief problem about ERA and abortion is that ERA would be interpreted
by federal judges who in a great number of cases have shown tremendous
sympathy for the ideology of abortion. With this amendment in force, thesejudges might well go on to, say, compel the funding of abortion. The Catholic
sympathizers of ERA seem to me to read the amendment in the air, ab-
stractly without sensitivity to the great political battle that is now going on
about abortion and without awareness that the majority of the federal judici-
ary are members of what can be fairly be described as the Oro-abortion party.
It would, I think, be a great mistake to give this party a new legal tool with
which to promote the abortion cause."'
Among writers supporting the ERA, there is almost a total absence of
any reference to the connection between the Amendment and abortion.
10 Rice, supra note 27, at 2-3.
10 Witherspoon, supra note 23, at 3.
'0 E. VoGEL, ABORTION AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: A CAu To COMMON SENSE! 9
(1978); Schlafly, supr note 23, at 88.
O Letter of Nov. 12, 1974, reprinted in VOGEL, supra note 109, at 8.
"' Letter of John T. Noonan, Jr. (Aug. 10, 1978).
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One legal author, Esther Helms Lexcen, discussing the subject, concluded:
"The ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment could result in national
legislation which would allow a pregnant woman to determine whether or
not to have an abortion.""'
As is well known, the forty-eight member Administrative Committee
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on May 1, 1978, unani-
mously refused to authorize the NCCB Committee on Women in Society
and the Church to issue a statement in support of the ERA. The abortion
issue was a significant factor in the decision. In its statement the Adminis-
trative Committee expressed its belief that "it would not be appropriate
for us to authorize issuance of a statement in support of the Equal Rights
Amendment because of uncertainty as to its legal and constitutional conse-
quences for family life, the abortion issue and other matters.""' Arch-
bishop John R. Roach, who made the announcement of the Administrative
Committee's decision, noted that the Church supported a human life
amendment and added: "To an extent, the ERA could pave the way" to
more abortions."1
IX. RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE ERA
One of the most controversial and emotionally-charged areas in the
ERA debate relates to the right to privacy in such places as public toilets,
locker rooms in public facilities and sleeping quarters in public institu-
tions. Many proponents of the Amendment have tried to avoid the issue
by a reductio ad absurdum. Thus, they have labeled it "ridiculous", a
"red-herring", the "potty problem." Many opponents, aware of the emo-
tional content of the question, have tended to magnify the issue to a degree
greater than it deserves.
The leading scholars of both sides of the ERA realize that the right to
privacy is an important question and, consequently, they try to deal with
it in intellectual terms. The proponents argue that the Amendment will
not necessitafe, and perhaps not even permit, integration of male and
female facilities for such activities as disrobing, sleeping and personal body
functions. Nor will the Amendment require integration of such facilities in
places of public accommodation, in prisons, in schools, or in the military."'
The supporters of the ERA admit that the Amendment calls for abso-
lute equality. They argue, however, that in the case of acts of personal
privacy, the basic principle of the ERA must be understood within the
total framework of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Amendment would
not prohibit a reasonable separation of persons of different sexes where
privacy is involved. In the words of the Senate Report, two principles
2 Lexcen, supra note 34, at 256.
Mn N.Y. Times, May 2,1978, at 18.
14 Id.
"' Bellamy, supra note 13, at 11; Emerson, supra note 11, at 231-32; Ferrell, supra note 7.
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justify separation of the sexes under the ERA in this area of activities
relating to personal privacy:
One principle involves the traditional power of the State to regulate cohabi-
tation and sexual activity by unmarried persons. This principle would permit
the State to require segregation of the sexes for these regulatory purposes
with respect to such facilities as sleeping quarters at coeducational colleges,
prison dormitories, and military barracks.
Another collateral legal principle flows from the constitutional right of
privacy established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S.. 479 (1965). This right would likewise permit a separation of the sexes
with respect to such places as public toilets, as well as sleeping quarters of
public institutions."'
The right of privacy first received constitutional recognition by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut."' In that decision, the Court
held that a married couple's right of privacy in the conjugal relationship
prohibited the state from legislating against their use of contraceptive
devices.I" In a 1972 case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, I" the Supreme Court held
that the right of privacy also protected unmarried persons' right to receive
contraceptive information. 2 " Again, in 1973, the two famous Supreme
Court abortion cases, Roe v. Wade' and Doe v. Bolton,' held that it was
the right of privacy which protected a woman, married or unmarried, dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy from interference by the state in her
decision whether to have an abortion. 12 3
It is admitted by supporters of the Amendment that the constitutional
right of privacy has been utilized only in cases relating to contraception
and abortion. '2 They argue, however, that since the Court has invoked this
right of privacy for the protection of a person's bodily functions in the two
important areas cited, there is "strong support to the belief that it will in
fact use the right to decide the relatively less important questions of the
constitutionality of sexually-segregated bathrooms and dormitories under
the Equal Rights Amendment.' '1 5
Professor Emerson and his co-authors insert, almost obiter dictum, an
important qualification to the position of the proponents that the right of
M S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 12; THE NEED FOR THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 14 (1973)
(published by Common Cause).
1,7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' Id. at 485-86.
,, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
"2 Id. at 454.
12, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
In 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
" Id. at 201; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973).
"I When the right to privacy was first put forth as a constitutional right in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it would seem to have been primarily a right of conjugal
privacy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), it was extended beyond the marital
limitations to become the right of privacy of anyone, married or unmarried, to procreate,
thereby foreshadowing its use again in the later abortion decisions.
125 BINGAMAN, supra note 6, at 34.
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privacy will prohibit sexual integration of rest rooms and sleeping facili-
ties. The scope of the right of privacy in the area of equal rights, the
Emerson article states, is contingent on the contemporaneous customs and
mores of the community: "Existing attitudes towards relations between
the sexes could change over time - are indeed now changing - and in that
event. the impact of the right of privacy would change too."' ' 2
Eminent legal scholars have taken an opposing position regarding the
impact of the ERA on the right to privacy and have questioned the validity
of the principles relied upon by the proponents for their position. Professor
Paul Freund of Harvard testified that the ERA "would require that there
be no segregation of the sexes in prison, reform schools, public restrooms
and other public facilities."'" Professor Philip Kurland of the University
of Chicago Law School also agreed that the Amendment would nullify laws
which require separate restrooms for males and females in public schools
and public buildings "unless the separate but equal doctrine is revived."'' 8
This position is similar to that of former Senator Sam Ervin when he was
chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Recognizing the Amendment's
basic principle of absolute equality between the sexes, he concluded that
the Amendment necessarily requires that "all laws which separate men
and women, such as separate schools, restrooms, dormitories, prisons, and
others will be stricken. Also, men and women will be thrown together with
no separation on the grounds of sex in the military."'1'
Opponents of the ERA do not accept the right of privacy as a clearly
established constitutional right which prohibits sexual integration of rest-
rooms, or dormitories, for example. Senator Ervin criticized the use of the
constitutional right to privacy in this area on the ground that the propo-
nents overlooked a constitutional law rule of interpretation to the effect
that:
[tihe most recent constitutional amendment takes precedence over all sec-
tions of the Constitution with which it is inconsistent. Thus, if the ERA is
to be construed absolutely, as its proponents say, then there can be no excep-
tions for elements of publicly imposed sexual segregation on the basis of
privacy between men and women.'1°
Professor Hillman also criticizes the application of the right of privacy
in this sphere since it is inconsistent with the absolute standard demanded
by the proponents. If that absolute equality, he argued, is now to be accom-
modated to current mores in the area of public toilets and sleeping quarters
under the guise of a right to privacy, then "the Amendment must become
a less definitive and more equivocal source of equal treatment than first
envisioned."'' The same writer then questions the right of privacy itself:
I Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 902.
"2 S. RE:P. No. 689, supra note 5, at 46.
in Id.
in Id.
139 Id.
"I Hillman, supra note 31, at 832.
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"In any case, the amorphous right of privacy which emerges from the six
separate opinions in Griswold seems less than a clear validation of the
continuance of sexually segregated restrooms despite ERA . . . . The
Court was torn asunder in its effort to identify the constitutional source of
the right and to define its essential character.' 3
The tenuous nature and scope of the constitutional right of privacy
was weakened by the 1976 Supreme Court decision, Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney. 33 In this decision, the Court upheld a Virginia statute
prohibiting sodomy by consenting adults which had been challenged as
violative of the constitutional right of privacy. An extensive analysis of this
case concluded that by this decision "the Supreme Court raised grave
doubts about the scope of a constitutional right of privacy, and - perhaps
deliberately - left doctrinal matters in this area in a state of profound
uncertainty.' ,s
Both Professors Witherspoon and Freund found serious problems with
the use of the right of privacy by proponents to justify an exception to their
absolute standard of sexual equality under the ERA. If the right of privacy,
though not expressed in the Amendment, constitutes a basis for exception
from the standard of absolute equality between sexes, then it can be asked:
when will the right prevail and when will it not? As an illustration, they
point to the constitutional right of freedom of association which clearly
enjoys a longer and firmer recognition than privacy. Yet, freedom of asso-
ciation may not be used to undercut the force of equal protection in the
area of racial discrimination. If the right of privacy can justify separate
restrooms and sleeping facilities, can it be invoked for separate physical
education classes in public schools or separate cells for men and women
in prisons?'3 '
The authors of Sex Discrimination and the Law foresee additional
difficulties with the invocation of the right of privacy particularly when
coupled with the qualification that it is dependent on current mores. They
contend that the doctrine might encourage the proliferation of exceptions
to the absolute equality required by the ERA beyond those contemplated
by the proponents. Examples of such exceptions may be a requirement
that only male policemen guard males or that only female nurses care for
female patients.' 3 The authors question the reference by the Senate Report
to the "traditional power of the state to regulate cohabitation and sexual
activity by unmarried persons" as a justification for laws that would re-
quire separate restrooms and other public facilities. They undermine the
3I Id. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion in Eisenstadt, referred to the right of
privacy's "tenuous moorings to the text of the Constitution . 405 U.S. at 472 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
"u 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
' Jones, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing the Door to a Fundamental Right of
Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 564 (1976).
,3 Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 234,
240-41 (1971); Witherspoon, supra note 23, at 2.
," CAUSES, supra note 2, at 160.
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force of that power, by noting that "[clonsistent interpretation of the
Equal Rights Amendment requires that no state interest, not even the
police power, be allowed to justify a law or regulation containing a sex-
based classification.'
3 7
The scope and force of this power can also be questioned today in the
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Eisenstadt protecting from the
state the right of unmarried persons to receive contraceptive information
and the abortion decisions protecting married and unmarried women from
interference by the state in their decisions whether or not to have an
abortion. Granted that the right of privacy will be recognized and that it
will justify separate but equal restrooms, locker rooms or sleeping quarters
in public institutions, the question arises if this right can be waived. The
authors of Sex-Based Discrimination feel that the Senate Report's refer-
ence to the traditional power of the state to regulate cohabitation and
sexual activities of the unmarried was intended to discredit the argument
that privacy is a personal right and therefore waivable.'3 s
A note in the Yale Law Journal discussed this question in reference
to the impact of the ERA on the military and concluded:
Since privacy is an individual right, the possibility of waiver raises special
problems. Presumably, if a group of service personnel waived their right to
be housed separately, the Equal Rights Amendment would require that they
be assigned quarters on the basis of sex-neutral criteria, which might result
in voluntary coeducational sleeping facilities.'3
A Harvard Law Review article on the ERA contends that the right of
privacy can be waived in certain circumstances and that the waiver might
compel the state to integrate facilities.
If harm from the very fact of segregation were shown, a state might be
required to provide sexually integrated facilities for those who want them (as
by rearranging existing dormitory space so that students could freely choose
between all-male, all-female, and mixed housing) or be forbidden from dis-
tinguishing facilities by sex at all.' °
X. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH LEGISLATION AND
MINISTRY AND THE ERA
In discussing the impact of the ERA on Church legislation and minis-
try, two major issues should be considered:
1. What effect would the passage of the ERA have upon the policy
and activities of the Catholic Church?
2. What would be the effect of the Amendment on the Church's
I+ d. at 927; see notes 176-77 infra.
'' See DISCRIMINATION, supra note 96, at 111.
In Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533, 1545 n.73 (1973),
quoted in CAUsES, supra note 2, at 172.
"' Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1516 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination].
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policy of excluding women from the priesthood?
The passage of the ERA may raise important questions for the
Catholic Church in its religious activity, its self-government and its non-
ecclesiastical but related activities. Today, the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment compels government to "stay out of the church's
religious activities, its internal government, and the operations of the
church hierarchy." With the passage of the ERA, the historical tradition
and case law interpretation of disputes involving church law, wherein the
federal courts have repeatedly warned state legislatures and state courts
to refrain from interference, will not change. This nonintervention will
apply even where church activities exclude women, so long as the exclusive
activity is religious in nature. Nevertheless, there may be changes in areas
such as education, where single sex institutions supported by the church
could be forced to convert to coeducation or lose government funding.
• The first amendment language that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof""' historically has stood for strict prohibition of governmental in-
terference in ecclesiastical matters. It is firmly established that the first
amendment severely restricts the courts in deciding religious disputes,
"even if such controversies affect civil rights."'42 As the Supreme Court
wrote in a 1947 decision: "We could not approve the slightest breach."" 
43
In this highly sensitive area "only the gravest abuses endangering
paramount interests" give occasion for permissible limitation via the
state's police power. As an example, acceptable religious practice was held
an insufficient justification to exempt Mormons from prosecution under
the laws prohibiting polygamy.' The Court noted that it was not attempt-
ing to impose its views on the religious practices of Mormons, but rather
that it was the state's paramount interest in marriage, a civil institution,
that necessitated regulation." 5 Where public safety was involved, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky upheld the state's restrictions on certain
harmful activities even though they were part of the religious service. This
limited intervention was viewed only as affecting the freedom to act, and
not the freedom to believe."'
In the most recent Supreme Court case, the Court held that there
must be a balancing between the state's legitimate interest in universal
education and other fundamental rights and interests specifically pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment."7 The parents
"I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"' See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Abuhoff,
Title VII and the Appointment of Women Clergy: A Statutory and Constitutional Quagmire,
13 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 257, 267 (1977).
14 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
M, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
"M Id. at 164-65.
'" See Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
"' See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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of Amish school children challenged the state's authority to require educa-
tion beyond the eighth grade as contrary to Amish religion and way of life.
The Court acknowledged the state's traditional and accepted interest in
universal formal education, but stated that even this paramount interest
is not totally free from a balancing approach where it impinges on funda-
mental religious beliefs protected by the first amendment. The Court
noted that the interests of the individuals had to be religiously grounded
to be entitled to constitutional protection: "A way of life, however virtuous
and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state
regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to
have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief."' 48 The record established at trial was held to support the
claim that the traditional life-style of the Amish was not "merely a matter
of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction"'49 and there-
fore, it was incumbent upon the state to show with more particularity how
its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. In the absence of such
proof, the Amish children were permitted to terminate their public educa-
tion after the eighth grade.' s
Matters of church government and internal administration histori-
cally have been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the civil authorities.''
There are no instances where government has regulated the religious doc-
trine of any group, nor has government intervened where church tribunals
have determined disputes in accordance with that church's own procedures
for self-governance. Property disputes which arose incidental to controver-
sies between rival churches seeking recognition by the official church hier-
archy were held to be non-reviewable by civil courts. Where the real issue
was "which church was the recognized one, and therefore entitled to the
property", the civil courts upheld the church action and would not become
involved. In Watson v. Jones, 52 two factions struggled for control of church
property, and one had been recognized by the highest ecclesiastical body
of the Presbyterian Church as the "regular and lawful" governing body of
that church. The court ruled that civil courts were bound by the ecclesias-
tical ruling:
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesiastical rule, custom
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which
the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions
as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before
them .53
", Id. at 215.
", Id. at 216.
11 Id. at 218.
"5' See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
"1 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
15 Id. at 727.
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Similarly, in a dispute involving the property of the Russian Orthodox
Church in New York, the Supreme Court held that "legislation that regu-
lates church administration, the operation of the churches or the appoint-
ment of clergy . . . prohibits the free exercise of religion."'' 4
In the same decision, the Supreme Court commented on previous
decisions relating to noninterference of the state in church matters by
noting that throughout these opinions there exists "a spirit of freedom for
religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipula-
tion - in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interfer-
ence, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doc-
trine."1 5
An obvious question arising from the ERA will be the role of women
in the church. Will the state interfere with church policy regarding admis-
sion of women to the priesthood or to certain ecclesiastical offices or in
performance of ceremonial rituals? The answer is "no." In cases already
decided, the constitutional prohibition against civil interference with
church doctrine and governance has been extended to the selection of the
church ministry. In instances concerning dismissal from a ministry, re-
moval from a particular pulpit, and a refusal of appointment to a chap-
laincy based on Canon Law, courts invariably have held that no jurisdic-
tion existed for civil court review of ecclesiastical action.
In a 1929 case, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,' the peti-
tioner, a Roman Catholic priest, brought an action to compel the Arch-
bishop to appoint him to a chaplaincy. The Archbishop refused to appoint
him on the ground that according to the canons of the new Code of Canon
Law he did not then have the qualifications required for the chaplaincy.
In upholding the decision of the Archbishop, the Supreme Court said:
Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the church
authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are
and whether the candidate possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation
before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made
them so by contract or otherwise." 7
In the later case of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, "5 the Supreme
Court stated: "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods
I" See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952). The Supreme Court
subsequently applied its Kedroff rationale in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960).
ID 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
', 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
"o Id. at 16. In Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that the "arbitrariness" exception in Gonzalez was inconsistent with the first
amendment mandate that the courts accept the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tri-
bunal on matters of doctrine and church government.
1- 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
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of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitu-
tional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state inter-
ference.' 59 The Court explained in a footnote that the "improper meth-
ods" meant the "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" exceptions in
Gonzalez.'10 It can be safely concluded that, except for the limited circum-
stances given above, "the Kedroff opinion . . .grants religious organiza-
tions absolute freedom to select their clergy. '
In more recent cases, decided after the civil rights legislation and the
landmark Supreme Court decisions of the 1960's, the courts continued to
strike down state interference in clergy selection. The fifth circuit, for
example, upheld a church's decision to oust its pastor, despite the pastor's
claim that his civil rights were denied and that he was dismissed because
of his views on race and the color of his wife's skin.' 2 The court stated that
the fundamental question of who will preach from the pulpit of a church
and who will occupy the parsonage is to be answered by the church and
not a civil court: "[That] determination . . .is at the very heart of the
free exercise of religion, which plaintiffs would corrode with an overlay of
civil rights legislation and other parts of the Constitution. The people of
the United States conveyed no power to Congress to vest its courts with
jurisdiction to settle purely ecclesiastical disputes."',1 3 In view of the
church's exclusive power over such questions, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that his own right to the free exercise of his religious
beliefs was denied by the church's action, stating that he was not pre-
vented from worshiping, but merely precluded from preaching to them.
Though he might have a breach of contract action under state law, as any
other employee of a church, the court stated, he has no right under the Free
Speech Clause of the first amendment to be paid for preaching to a congre-
gation that did not want to hear him. Moreover, if he was dismissed ac-
cording to procedures established by the church, his remedy was to follow
church procedure and appeal to the superior church authorities.
Similarly, legal precedent requires courts to refrain from interfering
with church actions where a sex discrimination charge was brought under
present federal law. In a Title VII (discrimination in employment) action,
plaintiff McClure, a Salvation Army ordained minister, alleged that she
received a lower salary and fewer fringe benefits than male ministers hold-
ing the same rank and responsibilities. The court refused to review dis-
missal of her claim on the grounds that Title VII did not cover the employ-
ment relationship between a church and its ministers, and that reading of
Title VII to cover McClure's employment as a minister (other employees
of the church in nonreligious work might be covered) would bring the
statute into direct conflict with the first amendment: "The relationship
IN Id. at 116.
Id. at 116 n.23 (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929)).
" Abuhoff, supra note 142, at 274.
" Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
'I Id. at 492.
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between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister
is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to -fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of
prime ecclesiastical concern."'' 1
Considering the facts in McClure v. Salvation Army, discussed above,
and the court's unwillingness to intervene in the dispute, it is unlikely that
any court would consider an action brought by women for admission to the
Catholic priesthood. The Salvation Army allowed women into the minis-
try. Thus, a decision in McClure compelling equal treatment of both men
and women holding similar positions in the church would not have touched
upon the basic teachings of the church. In other words, the court could
have held that the petitioner in McClure was arbitrarily denied these
benefits, and the Salvation Arffy would have had no first amendment
"freedom of exercise" claim since church doctrine and belief were not in
issue. Because the McClure court did not rule that such a discriminatory
practice was invalid even where it was not predicated on church dogma, a
fortiori the courts would not invalidate sex-based discrimination in inter-
nal church administration where such action is predicated on and directly
concerns a specific tenet of Catholic teaching:
In the Catholic Church, women are not permitted to become priests
or to hold specified executive or decision-making posts in the Vatican. The
Catholic Church's position has not waivered even after the ministries of
other churches have begun admitting women. The Vatican statement as-
serted that female priesthood is inconsistent with the fact that Christ was
a man. For the celebrant of the Mass to successfully express Christ's role
in the Eucharist, he must physically resemble Christ. Moreover, the exclu-
sion of women from the priesthood is not only a traditional practice based
on church history, but is held to be an important component of the Catho-
lic Church's teaching.
There should be no apprehension that the ERA would cause judicial
intervention in religious practices. Where such practices directly contra-
dicted constitutional doctrine, there is already precedent for noninterven-
tion. For example, until this past year, the Mormon Church welcomed
blacks as members but did not admit them to the ministry. There is no
instance of government intervention to change that policy.
The Catholic Church is involved in many activities beyond its primary
religious one. It operates schools, hospitals and other social service institu-
tions. It is the recipient of large amounts of government subsidies for these
activities, and it receives a tax exemption on all property that it owns and
on income it receives, as do other nonprofit religious, charitable, and cul-
tural organizations. It is perhaps in these "support" activities where the
ERA may have an impact on the church.
There is one reported instance where a church-run institution was
denied government funds because its policies were "unconstitutional." In
I McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Bob Jones University v. Johnson,"5 plaintiff, a Fundamentalist school in
South Carolina, taught that the Bible forbids the internharriage of the
races. It therefore denied admission to unmarried nonwhites. The courts
upheld the position of the Federal Veterans Administration, which refused
to grant Veterans Benefits to students attending Bob Jones. This is a lower
court decision and, although affirmed by the circuit court,' is the only
decision of its kind. Moreover, as an example of the possible difficulty for
the Catholic Church, it is readily distinguishable in that women are wel-
come to join the Catholic Church. The exclusion of women is from the
ministry, not from membership. A closer analogy may be drawn from the
experience of the Mormon Church which welcomes blacks as members, but
until this past year did not accept them into the ministry. Unlike Funda-
mentalist institutions, Mormon churches and schools continue to enjoy
their tax exemption and to receive government benefits that were granted
to other church schools. If the fifth amendment did not affect Mormon
churches by reason of their position on blacks serving as clergymen, the
ERA will not affect the Catholic Church by reason of its position on women
clergy.
The Catholic Church, although organized for religious and not com-
mercial purposes, would nevertheless be considered an "employer" en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce. On this basis, it would be subject
to legislation relating to social interests and policies. "Organizations af-
fecting commerce may not escape the coverage of social legislation by
showing that they were created for fraternal or religious purposes.'' 67
One of the leading scholars in favor of the ERA, Professor Ruth Bader
Ginsburg of Columbia Law School, expressed her assurances that the
Amendment would not conflict with church doctrine and practices, espe-
cially in relation to restrictions on women entering the ordained ministry.
Asked whether ratification of the ERA would affect the tax-exempt status
of churches and church schools if they continued to prohibit women from
becoming ministers, Professor Ginsburg responded: "A high wall of separa-
tion between church and state is basic to our system. It appears virtually
certain that, in the event of a challenge, courts would construe ERA in a
manner that avoids collision with religious doctrine and practice relating
to the ministry."' 68
It is reasonable to predict that the ERA will have no direct effect on
Catholic religious belief, church legislation on the ministry, internal
church administration or other policies based on tenets of religious belief.
The Amendment may have an indirect effect on policies and activities of
church-administered institutions (schools, hospitals, social service agen-
cies). It is likely, however, that such an effect would be manifested mainly
1" 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974).
' 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
"a McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972).
"' Letter from Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Barbara Burton of the League of Women
Voters (June 10, 1975).
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by the denial of government aid programs to such religious institutions.
That is, while the ERA would not dictate a change in the programs or
practices of any of these agencies, it may result in the denial of federal
funding to them. Given the existing precedent, however, it is unlikely that
the Amendment would have any effect on tax exemption, curriculum or
selection of clientele. As admission to the priesthood and other ecclesiasti-
cal offices restricted to clerics is determined by criteria predicated on
religious beliefs, it would be unaffected by the ERA.
XI. Is THE ERA THE PROPER VEHICLE FOR REFORM?
While few dispute the lofty aims of the ERA, many have contended
that something less than a constitutional mandate can achieve its goal. As
Professor Paul A. Freund wrote: "The issue has always been over choice
of means, not over ends.""'
There are three possible vehicles whereby unjust sex discrimination
may be eliminated: the legislative approach through the revision of federal
and state laws; the judicial approach through the application of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (and its equivalent in the
fifth amendment); or the constitutional amendment.
The primary argument for the necessity of an amendment can be
summarized in a syllogism:
There is still extensive sex discrimination in current law in the United States.
Neither legislative changes nor judicial action has removed the discrimina-
tion.
Therefore, a constitutional amendment is necessary.
The chief counterargument of the opponents can likewise be encapsu-
lated in the following syllogism:
There are vestigial laws which still impose unjust discrimination on account
of sex.
Such legal discrimination can be eliminated by legislative changes and judi-
cial action.
Therefore, a constitutional amendment is not necessary.
Much of the dispute over the means of achieving equality centers on
the interpretation of Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the different tests applied by the Supreme Court to determine
if there has been a violation of this Clause. A few basic observations on
this amendment and the judicial criteria will help to understand the op-
posing positions.
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, ratified
in 1868, reads: "Nor [shall any state] deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.""'7 In deciding whether or not
there has been a violation of this Clause, the Supreme Court has devised
"I Freund, supra note 135, at 234.
"0 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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two major tests: The "minimum scrutiny" or "reasonableness" test, and
the "strict scrutiny" test.
"Minimum Scrutiny" or "Reasonableness" Test
Under the "minimum scrutiny" or "reasonableness" test, a court will
uphold a statute as constitutional if two criteria are met: The purpose of
the statute is a valid one, and the classifications made or the persons to
which the law applies are "reasonably" related to the purpose for which
the statute was passed.
Because of the vast police powers of the states, the first criterion of
the validity of purpose is almost always fulfilled. The second criterion is
met if the court itself can imagine any reason whatsoever for the classifica-
tion made in a law.
Under this lenient test, the person attacking the constitutionality of
an act has the burden of proving that the law is completely devoid of any
reason for its classification of the persons subject to the law. Since the
court can almost invariably imagine some reason to provide at least a
minimum rational basis why the state may have enacted the statute in
question, a state law is almost always sustained against an equal protec-
tion challenge under the "minimum scrutiny" or "reasonableness" test.
"Strict Scrutiny" Test
Under the "strict scrutiny" test, the state has the burden of proving
both that it had a "compelling state interest" for enacting the statute, and
that classification of persons to whom the law applies was necessary to
fulfill the state's "compelling interest."
Because of the heavy burden of proof placed on the state, a law chal-
lenged under this "strict scrutiny" test is almost always declared unconsti-
tutional.
This test is generally applied for cases involving "suspect classifica-
tions" and "fundamental interests." The Supreme Court has thus far la-
beled as "suspect classifications" those based on such qualities as race,
alienage and nationality. It has not included sex as a "suspect classifica-
tion." Identified by the Court as among "fundamental interests" are vot-
ing, hearings for the criminally accused, interstate travel, and probably
first amendment liberties.
History of the Equal Protection Clause and Sex Discrimination
After the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the Su-
preme Court, using the "minimum scrutiny" or "reasonableness" test,
upheld a number of statutes which differentiated between men and
women.' Not until over a hundred years later, in 1971, did the Court hold
"' See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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a sex-based classification unconstitutional. In the landmark case of Reed
v. Reed,'72 the Supreme Court held as unreasonable and in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment an Idaho statute
which gave preference to men over women as administrators of a dece-
dent's estate.
This was followed in 1973 by Frontiero v. Richardson 3 in which the
Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held unconstitutional an Air Force
regulation which automatically granted dependency benefits to wives of
male officers but gave similar benefits to husbands of female officers only
if they proved actual dependency on their wives. Significant in this deci-
sion was the fact that four of the justices held sex to be a "suspect classifi-
cation" and to be treated'as such in future cases.
In 1974, the Supreme Court applied the "reasonableness" test to up-
hold two statutes involving sex-based classifications. In Kahn v. Shevin, 7 ,
the Court upheld a Florida law which awarded a $500 property tax exemp-
tion to all widows but not to widowers. In Geduldig v. Aiello,' the Court
sustained a California statute which excluded from unemployment insur-
ance all disabilities related to pregnancy. The majority held that this
exclusion did not involve discrimination based on sex.
In 1975, the Supreme Court overruled its prior holding which permit-
ted certain exemptions from jury service in favor of women only. 76 By its
decision in Taylor v. Louisiana,'71 the Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a jury system which automatically exempted from jury duty all
women but required all men to register for service. In that same year, the
Court applied the "reasonableness" test in Schlesinger v. Ballard'78 and
upheld a regulation which accorded to female Navy officers three years
more than the time granted to male officers in which to receive a promotion
or be discharged. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld7 9 was the third sex-
discrimination case of 1975. In this case, the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a Social Security statute which restricted survivors' insurance bene-
fits to mothers of dependent children and allowed none for fathers in simi-
lar circumstances. The last sex-discrimination case of 1975 was Stanton v.
Stanton. ""' In this case, the Court, applying the "reasonableness" test, held
unconstitutional a Utah statute setting different ages of majority for males
and females.
In the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren,'' the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that established a minimum drink-
172 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
1- 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
174 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
115 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
1'' Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
"r 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
178 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
17 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
"s 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
I' 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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ing age of 21 for males and 18 for females. The Court held that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be related to the achievement of those objectives."
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court applied the "minimum scru-
tiny" or "reasonableness" test. The high-water mark was Frontiero v.
Richardson where the Supreme Court stopped one vote short of declaring
sex a "suspect classification." It was after Frontiero that the movement for
equal rights for women became convinced that sex would not be designated
a "suspect classification" and pressed for a constitutional amendment as
the only solution for equality of rights.
Arguments in Favor of a Constitutional Amendment as Effective Vehicle
The following survey is illustrative of the arguments put forth by the
leading scholars in favor of the ERA as the most appropriate vehicle for
achieving equality between the sexes.
1. Professor Thomas I. Emerson and other authors:"2
a. An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court demon-
strates that there is no present likelihood that the Court will apply the
Equal Protection Clause in a manner that will effectively guarantee
equality of rights for women.
b. There is need for a single coherent theory of women's equality
before the law, and for a consistent nationwide application of this
theory. This is scarcely possible through legislative change alone, for
the creation of basic policy would be divided among multiple federal,
state and local agencies.
c. Once passed, the Amendment will provide an immediate mandate,
a nationally uniform theory of sex equality and the prospect of perman-
ence to buttress efforts to end discrimination.
2. Majority Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary:1
a. Some legislative progress has been made toward equal rights but
not enough to wipe out all discrimination against women in state and
federal law.
b. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply the four-
teenth amendment to discrimination based on sex with the same vigor
it applies the amendment to distinctions based on race.
c. We cannot overlook the immense symbolic importance of the ERA.
The women of our country must have tangible evidence of our commit-
ment to guarantee equal treatment under law.
d. The Committee concludes that because of the pervasive legal sex
discrimination which now exists, and because of the inadequacy of
legislative and judicial remedies, there is a clear and undeniable need
for the ERA.
3. Ruth M. Ferrell: 14
iR2 See Constitutional Basis, supra note 5, at 875, 883-84.
"0 See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 6-7, 11.
"u See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 854-63.
THE ERA
a. The inadequacy of the legislative method without the impetus of a
constitutional amendment is apparent. The piecemeal revision or re-
peal of the multitude of statutes, rules and regulations which would be
required is subject to endless delay and uncertainty.
b. Without a constitutional amendment, there would be nothing to
prevent retrogression and enactment of discriminatory laws in the fu-
ture.
4. Authors of Women's Rights and The Law:'"
a. In light of the erratic history of the Supreme Court, the need for
the ERA as a clear and uncompromising standard of sex equality is
apparent.
b. The ERA will set a uniform standard of equality across the nation,
so that men and women will not be subject to treatment held lawful in
one state and unlawful in its neighbor.
c. The ERA is a mandate for the states to undertake or complete this
process of reform.
d. The ERA will preclude the need for a case-by-case definition of
equality with its unpredictability.
e. The ERA will assure the women of this country a permanent com-
mitment to equal treatment of the sexes.
5. Harvard Law Review Note on the ERA:'"
a. The most compelling argument for a constitutional amendment is
that, unlike a statute, its ability to reach deep into the well of state law
is unquestioned. Potentially, it can sweep away every vestige of legal
sex discrimination.
b. An Amendment is permanent, highly symbolic.
c. The Amendment guarantees a hearing in the courts for everyone
who claims to be oppressed by even the most obscure and seemingly
trivial legal sexual distinctions.
Arguments in Opposition to a Constitutional Amendment as the Appropri-
ate Vehicle.
Eminent scholars have expressed their reasons in opposition to a con-
stitutional amendment as the most effective method for achieving the
eradication of unjust sexual discrimination. The following survey is repre-
sentative of the arguments expressed by these scholars.
1. Former Senator Sam Ervin:87
a. Since 1971, in at least eight cases, the Supreme Court has held in
substance that any law which makes any distinction whatever between
the legal rights and responsibilities of men and women is unconstitu-
tional unless the distinction is based upon reasonable grounds and is
In See WoMEN's RIGHTS, supra note 7, at v-vi.
10 BniNoAmA, supra note 6, at 15-16; Bayh, supra note 14, at 4-11; Conlin, supra note 35, at
321-31; Dorsen & Ross, supra note 25, at 216-20; Sex Discrimination, supra note 140, at 1519.
'' Sen. Ervin, Jr., Why the Equal Rights Amendment Should be Rejected (Statement of Jan.
4, 1977 to North Carolina General Assembly), reprinted in THE PHLus SCHIAnLy RmPOr, vol.
10, No. 9, Apr. 1977; S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 29-31.
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designed to protect women in some role they enact in life. It is submit-
ted that these holdings of the Court afford a far better way to satisfy
the wishes of advocates of ratification of the ERA, whose approach
would invalidate any law making any legal distinctions between men
and women.
b. Recent acts of Congress, recent executive orders of the President
and recent regulations of federal departments and agencies prohibit
discrimination on the ground of sex in education, employment, financ-
ing, housing, public accommodations, and all other federal activities.
These same acts, orders and regulations forbid states and their subdivi-
sions and all private persons to discriminate on the basis of sex in any
activity of any nature which is financed in whole or in part by federal
funds. The result is that invidious discrimination against women is
illegal in virtually all areas of American life.
c. The states have enacted multitudes of laws to buttress the federal
laws, orders and regulations outlawing discrimination on the basis of
sex. Virtually all the states have repealed their former laws discrimi-
nating against women in major respects. There may still be remaining
in some states insignificant laws which discriminate against women
and which the states would expunge if brought to their attention. It is
submitted that the ERA is not needed to nullify any such remaining
laws.
d. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the fifth amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, and other constitu-
tional provisions and recent federal and state laws nullifying invidious
legal discriminations against women make it manifest that the ERA is
totally unnecessary.
2. Professor Paul A. Freund:1Iu
a. The Equal Protection Clause together with the ample legislative
powers of Congress, is the best avenue to achieve meaningful equality
of the sexes under law. This approach is greatly to be preferred to one
that would force all the manifold legal relationships to men and
women, from coverage under selective service to the obligation of fam-
ily support, into a mold of mechanical unity.
b. Even if the Amendment were adopted, legislation on the state and
federal level would be necessary to carry out its myriad applications.
c. If anything about this Amendment is clear, it is that it would
transform every provision of law concerning women into a constitu-
tional issue to be ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Every statutory and common law provision dealing with
the manifold relation of women in society would be forced to run the
gauntlet of attack on constitutional grounds. The range of such poten-
tial litigation is too great to be readily foreseen.
d. It may be suggested that the Amendment would serve importantly
as a symbol - a symbol that the nation has made a commitment to
' S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 30; Freund, supra note 135, at 236-42; Statement of Paul
Freund, Roscoe Pound and Other Lawyers and Legal Scholars in Opposition to the ERA, 118
CONG. REc. 9096 (1972).
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justice for women under law. If, however, the Amendment is not only
a needless misdirection of effort in the quest for justice, but one which
would produce anomalies, confusion, and injustices, no symbolic value
could justify its value."'
e. To eliminate discrimination based on sex, a few significant deci-
sions of the Supreme Court in well-chosen cases under the fourteenth
amendment would have a salutary effect. In addition, Congress can
exercise its enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment to
identify and displace state laws that in its judgment work an unreason-
able discrimination based on sex. Finally, all discrimination, private or
governmental, is subject to the paramount power of Congress under the
commerce clause.
3. Professor Philip B. Kurland:190
a. The proper function of an amendment is to be the necessary means
for protecting minorities from being imposed on by the majority and
for protecting the unenfranchised against imposition by the enfran-
chised. Women, however, are neither a minority nor unenfranchised.
Therefore, the most appropriate means for bringing about the desired
changes would be by appropriate legislation rather than constitutional
amendment. -
b. There can be little doubt that the fourteenth amendment and the
commerce clause give the national legislature more than adequate au-
thority to ban discrimination on the basis of sex.
c. A sound program of legislative reforms would do more, especially
under the mandate now received from the Supreme Court in Reed v.
Reed,"' to eliminate more of the grievances that women have against
their roles frequently imposed on them in our society. Legislation can
get at specific problems in a way that no constitutional provision can.
4. James J. Kilpatrick:"12
a. The ERA is unnecessary. It is a sound proposition that a constitu-
tional amendment should be viewed as a political act of last resort. If
time should demonstrate the unwisdom or the undesirability of the
ERA, only a monumental effort could achieve its repeal. Ratification
is radical surgery. If any other effective way can be found to cure a
political illness, surely the alternatives ought to be tried first. Such
alternative remedies already are being applied. By legislative enact-
ment and by court decision, most of the invidious and unwarranted
discrimination against women can be corrected.
b. The Amendment is uncertain. More than a hundred years have
passed since there has been a constitutional amendment as vague and
ambiguous as the pending ERA.
" More and more proponents of the ERA are agreeing that the Amendment will be largely
symbolic since most sex-discriminatory legislation has been eliminated or neutralized. Its
direct effect will be mainly to eradicate the vestiges of any legislation that might be consid-
ered sexually discriminatory. See generally WOMEN'S IGHTS, supra note 7, at 11; E. CARY &
K. PERATrS, WOMEN AND THE LAw 50 (1970); Sex Discrimination, supra note 140, at 1519.
'" S. REP. No. 689, supra note 5, at 31; Kurkland, supra note 20, at 243, 250.
'' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
,"Kilpatrick, The Case Against ERA, NATION'S Bus., Jan. 1975, at 9-10.
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c. But as a matter of law - as a matter of actual application - what
is meant by a constitutional commandment that "equality of rights
under the law" shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex? No
one knows.
5. Senator Orrin G. Hatch:"3
a. In order to end all discriminations against women, it is not neces-
sary to abolish all legal distinctions between men and women. Yet this
is precisely what the amendment seeks to accomplish. By abolishing
all legal distinctions between men'and women, the ERA also abolishes
a number of rights and privileges which women now enjoy.
b. Because the proposed ERA speaks in such broad terms, admitting
to no variations, it is generally agreed among leading constitutional
scholars that there is no way of discerning the ultimate reach of the
Amendment.
c. In sum, the ERA is unnecessary because it has already been
preempted by major changes in the law and in judicial decisions which
grant equal rights to women. It is undesirable because it deprives
women of many rights which they now possess, imposes new obligations
upon them which are neither wanted nor needed, and usurps the pow-
ers of the states by transferring vast powers to the federal government.
6. Harvard Law Review Note on the ERA:" '
a. There are several advantages to a legislative approach. First, legis-
lation can resolve particular problems without any obligation to resolve
the next problem in precisely the same way. Second, legislation is able
to reconcile the principle of no sex discrimination with competing val-
ues such as privacy and claimed benefits of distinction. Finally, legisla-
tion can easily be modified in the light of experience.
b. In the Amendment's very sweep and power, lie its most serious
weaknesses.
i. Unlike a statute, it cannot distinguish as easily between those
laws we wish to eliminate and the few we may wish to keep.
ii. An amendment delegates to a single individual the power,
through the courts, to work out the details of its governing principal,
even if his views conflict with the desires of a majority of those affected.
The majority of women may, for example, favor retaining sex-
distinguishing laws which restrict their working conditions or protect
their privacy. A single dissenting member of the class would, under an
amendment, have the potential power to invalidate such laws. A
broadly worded statute would also delegate to a single disaffected indi-
vidual the power to achieve results out of proportion to his political
power. If the results of such private litigations are displeasing, however,
Congress can amend the statute. Correcting the results of individual
litigation under an amendment is far more difficult.
U Hatch, The Intelligent Woman's Guide to the Equal Rights Amendment, Fall 1977, at 11-
12, 15-16, 18.
I" Sex Discrimination, supra note 140, at 140. See also Rice, supra note 27, at 1-2; Wither-
spoon, supra note 23, at 3; Positive Panacea, supra note 41, at 957-89.
APPENDIX
the Code of Canon Law Differentiating Between Men and
Canon 13
Canon 58
Canon 80
Canon 88
Canon 90
Canon 93
Canon 98
Canon 106
Canons 108-486
Canon 118
Canon 133
Canon 145
Canon 153
Canon 154
Canon 198
Canon 210
Canon 223
Canon 223
Canon 232
Canon 265
Canon 282
Canon 286
The effect of particular law would affect women in a
special way by reason of their ability to acquire a
domicile.
Can a woman execute a rescript by mandate?
Women cannot grant dispensations since they do not
have jurisdiction.
The canonical age of puberty is defined in different
ways for males and females.
Inequality of law regarding quasi-domicile and domi-
cile.
Inequality of law concerning domicile.
Inequality of law regarding transfer of rite on occa-
sion of marriage.
There are no rules of precedence for women.
The section on Clerics reveals a general inequality.
Crucial canon for limitation on jurisdictional power.
A warning established in law against relationships
with women.
Women cannot hold an ecclesiastical office. (Cf.
Canon 197).
Women cannot be promoted to office.
Women cannot have office involving care of souls.
A woman cannot be an Ordinary.
Women cannot have power of Orders.
A woman cannot be a Canon Theologian.
Women Superiors (example - Leadership Confer-
ence of Women Religious) are not to be invited to
Councils.
Women cannot be made Cardinals.
Can a woman be a Legate of the Holy See?
Women cannot be invited to Plenary and Provincial
Councils.
Women Religious have no part in Plenary or Provin-
cial Councils.
THE ERA
Canons in
Women
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Canon 297
Canon 302
Canon 305
Canon 309
Canon 323
Canon 329
Canon 358
Canon 360
Canon 367
Canon 372
Canon 372
Canon 373
Canon 385
Canon 391
Canon 423
Canon 429
Canon 432
Canon 434
Canon 445
Canon 451
Canons 471-78
Canon 479
Canon 488
Canon 497
Women are not given the duty to care for souls.
It appears that the Missionary Council is to be com-
posed only of males.
It appears that there is no incentive given for female
vocations.
A Pro-Vicar or Pro-Prefect can only have a male as
his delegate.
If a woman should be able to receive jurisdiction in
the Church can she be an Abbess or Prelate Nullius?
Women cannot be Bishops because of lack of Orders.
Women are excluded from Diocesan Synods.
The Synodal Commissions cannot be composed of
females.
A woman cannot be Vicar General.
A woman cannot be Chancellor.
Can a woman be a Vice-Chancellor?
Women cannot be notaries in criminal cases of cler-
ics.
Can women be Synodal Examiners or Parish
Consultors?
The Chapter is limited to College of Clerics thereby
excluding women.
Women cannot be Diocesan Consultors as law de-
mands "sacerdotes."
Women cannot supply for an impeded Bishop (virum
ecclesiasticum).
Can a woman be an oeconomus?
Women cannot be Vicar Capitular.
Women cannot be Vicars Forane.
Women cannot be pastors, or equivalent.
Women cannot be any parochial vicar.
Women cannot be Rector of a Church.
A lay woman may never be a member of clerical reli-
gion, while a lay male can be such a member.
A need for special beneplacitum of the Holy See to
set up a House of Monasteries of Nuns.
THE ERA
Canon 497
Canon 498
Canon 500
Canon 501
Canon 503
Canon 506
Canon 510
Canon 512
Canon 517
Canons 518-30
Canon 533
Canon 534
Canon 535
Canon 539
Canon 544
Canon 544
Canon 547
Canons 550-51
Canon 552
Houses of Women Religious do not have any privi-
leges of having a connected Church or public Oratory.
A Monastery of Nuns can be suppressed without
Apostolic approval but it is needed for the establish-
ment of such a Monastery.
With special indult, Women's Institutes may be sub-
jected to Men's Institutes.
Women Religious are excluded from any ecclesiasti-
cal jurisdiction in any forum.
Women Religious may not constitute Notaries on
their own.
Women cannot preside at election of their own Supe-
rior General.
Bishop must countersign Quinquennial Report of
Women Religious.
The Ordinary must visit Nuns' Monasteries and the
rules differentiate between Nuns (moniales) and
Monks (monachi).
Women Religious do not deal with Holy See through
their own Procurator General, as male religious can.
There are differences in appointment and availability
of confessors for men and women religious.
Women Religious need prior consent of Ordinary for
deposit of certain funds.
Nuns and diocesan religious need consent of Ordi-
nary for alienation.
An account of administration must be made to the
Ordinary of the place for Women Religious.
Postulancy is required for all Women Religious.
Women novices do not have to present testimonial
letters of Bishop of origin - men do.
Women need different letters of reference.
Nuns need a dowry.
The Ordinary is involved in supervising the dowry of
nuns.
The Ordinary must certify freedom to enter the novi-
tiate and profession for women religious - not for
men.
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Canon 566
Canon 580
Canon 597
Canon 598
Canon 600
Canon 601
Canon 602
Canon 603
Canon 607
Canon 609
Canon 613
Canon 615
Canon 623
Canon 643
Canon 645
Canon 647
Canons 651-52
Canon 709
Canon 712
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There are differences in establishing confessors of
women novices.
The permission of the Ordinary of the place is needed
for nuns to change their wills.
Nuns need the judgment of the Ordinary to deter-
mine the cloister limits.
Women are excluded from male cloister.
No one may enter a female cloister without permis-
sion of the Holy See but exceptions are more numer-
ous.
Nuns may not leave the cloister without permission
of the Holy See.
There are architectural norms for nuns' cloister.
The Ordinary of the place has vigilance over nuns'
cloister.
Women Religious may not go out alone.
Parishes may not be established in the churches of
female religious.
There is inequality in communicating privileges
among men and women in the same order.
Nuns not subject to male regular Superiors are also
not exempt from Ordinary of the Place (nuns may not
be exempt at all).
Special caution when entrusting collection of alms to
women religious.
There is inequality regarding money when leaving the
Community.
The return of Fugitive or Apostate nuns is the con-
cern of the Ordinary of the Place.
Nuns in temporary vows are dismissed by Ordinary
of the Place.
There are different rules for dismissal of Religious
Women in perpetual vows from rules governing men's
dismissals.
Women are limited in their manner of belonging to
confraternities.
Men may not join associations erected with Churches
or Oratories of Religious Women.
THE ERA
Canon 742
Canon 756
Canon 777
Canon 802
Canon 813
Canons 871-72
Canon 876
Canons 909-10
Canon 938
Canons 948-1011
Canon 1020
Canon 1067
Canon 1074
Canon 1094
Canon 1097
Canon 1112
Canon 1125
Canon 1143
Canon 1146
Canon 1205
Canon 1209
A preference of a male over a female as minister of
baptism.
A preference indicated for the particular rite of the
male.
There are different norms for admitting parentage of
father and mother.
Women cannot offer Mass.
Women cannot minister at altar.
Women may not be ministers of penance.
There is special delegation required for confessions of
Women Religious.
There is a special place established for confessions of
women.
Women may not annoint.
The ordination canons (especially 968) as regards
minister and recipient limited to men.
Special caution when determining women's free con-
sent to marriage.
There is divergence in the impediment of age with
regard to -males and females.
The impediment of raptus - presumes against males
only.
The canonical form demands a male as the official
minister since it demands a priest.
There is an inequal element of choice for the place of
marriage since the law favors the parish of the fe-
male.
A married woman cannot choose her own canonical
effects, e.g., domicile, name.
Privilege of Faith cases which permit in certain cir-
cumstances a man to choose upon baptism to live
with one of several wives. No equal provision for
women.
Women can receive the nuptial blessing only once.
Women cannot administer sacramentals.
Only noble women can be buried in Churches.
There is a discrimination of the question of burial site
- clerics as opposed to all others.
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Canon 1223
Canon 1225
Canon
Canon
1229
1262
Affirms a strict right of wife to select her own Church
of funeral and cemetery.
There is a restriction of choosing the Church of
burial for nuns.
A wife is to be buried in the tomb of her husband.
Legislates separate places in Church according to
gender.
There are different dress codes for men and women
in Church.
Women Religious should not be seen while singing.
Nuns may not reserve the Blessed Sacrament within
the Monastery or choir but only in their Church.
Women cannot receive faculty to authenticate relics.
Women are not to lead processions.
Corpus Christi procession is limited to male partici-
pants.
Bishops may select only worthy men to assist in the
office of preaching.
Women may not preach formally.
Women are excluded from Seminary Boards.
Women are excluded as Seminary Professors.
Women cannot be ecclesiastical censors.
Only clerics may receive a benefice, thereby exclud-
ing women.
Wife can exercise the ius patronatus on her own.
The financial administrative council is composed of
men only.
Other administrative boards are composed only of
men as needed in individual cases.
Women cannot be Officialis or Vice Officialis.
Women cannot be Pro-synodal Judges.
Women cannot be Consulting Assessors.
Women cannot be Auditors.
Women cannot be Defenders of the Bond or Promot-
ers of the Faith.
Women cannot be Auditors of the Holy Roman Rota.
Canon 1262
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
1264
1267
1283
1290
1291
Canon 1327
Canon 1342
Canon 1359
Canon 1360
Canon 1393
Canon 1442
Canon 1456
Canon 1520
Canon 1521
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
1573
1574
1575
1581
1589
Canon 1598
THE ERA
Canon 1770
Canon 1979
Canon 1980
Canons 1993-98
Canon 2004
Canon 2004
Canon 2017
Canon 2033
Canon 2047
Canon 2176
Canon 2214
Canon 2218
Canon 2342
Canon 2353
Canons 2412-14
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Nuns are not to come to Tribunal to give testimony;
they are to be heard in their monasteries.
Special emphasis on the physical examination of
women.
Special rules for examination of women.
Involve cases of Sacred Orders thereby excluding
women.
Women can act in beatification process only through
Procurator; men can act on their own.
Procurator in canonization causes must be a priest,
therefore male.
The Notary or Chancellor in canonization causes
must be a priest.
"Virorum illustrium" covers women but indicates
chauvinism in wording.
There is a special norm for the beatification of female
religious.
The warning of Canon 137 against relationships of
Clerics with suspect women (not men) is given a spe-
cial process.
Sexist language ("filios et fratres").
Sex of the delinquent is a factor in the determination
of ecclesiastical penalties.
There are different norms for the violation of the
cloisters of men as distinct from women.
It seems that only men can incur the penalties at-
tached to the crime of raptus.
Special rules for the Superior Generals of Women
Religious (Antistitae).
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